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ABSTRACT 
The application of Bayesian networks within the field of institutional research is explored 
through the development of a Bayesian network used to predict first- to second-year retention of 
undergraduates.  A hybrid approach to model development is employed, in which formal 
elicitation of subject-matter expertise is combined with machine learning in designing model 
structure and specification of model parameters.  Subject-matter experts include two academic 
advisors at a small, private liberal arts college in the southeast, and the data used in machine 
learning include six years of historical student-related information (i.e., demographic, 
admissions, academic, and financial) on 1,438 first-year students.  Netica 5.12, a software 
package designed for constructing Bayesian networks, is used for building and validating the 
 
 
model.  Evaluation of the resulting model’s predictive capabilities is examined, as well as 
analyses of sensitivity, internal validity, and model complexity.  Additionally, the utility of using 
Bayesian networks within institutional research and higher education is discussed.  
The importance of comprehensive evaluation is highlighted, due to the study’s inclusion 
of an unbalanced data set.  Best practices and experiences with expert elicitation are also noted, 
including recommendations for use of formal elicitation frameworks and careful consideration of 
operating definitions.  Academic preparation and financial need risk profile are identified as key 
variables related to retention, and the need for enhanced data collection surrounding such 
variables is also revealed.  For example, the experts emphasize study skills as an important 
predictor of retention while noting the absence of collection of quantitative data related to 
measuring students’ study skills.  Finally, the importance and value of the model development 
process is stressed, as stakeholders are required to articulate, define, discuss, and evaluate model 
components, assumptions, and results.   
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1 A BAYESIAN APPROACH, EXPERT ELICITATION, AND BAYESIAN 
NETWORKS AS APPLICABLE TO INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH:  A REVIEW OF 
THE LITERATURE 
While applications of a Bayesian approach to statistics are commonly practiced in a 
number of fields, examples of studies addressing and incorporating Bayesian statistics in 
educational research are less common.  Narrowing the field of interest to institutional research, 
defined by Saupe (1990) as “research conducted within an institution of higher education to 
provide information that supports institutional planning, policy formation and decision making” 
(p.1), a Bayesian approach to research offers a tool box rich in resources for handling and 
modeling the uncertainty, complexity, and uniqueness of institutional data while also providing a 
formal mechanism for incorporating institutional memory, expertise, and prior data into analysis.  
With an eye towards the completion of a Bayesian research study within the field of institutional 
research, this manuscript provides a comprehensive review of the literature surrounding a 
Bayesian approach to institutional research.  Beginning with a background of general Bayesian 
statistics, the review also discusses the elicitation of subjective probabilities and development 
and use of Bayesian networks.   
Guiding Questions 
The guiding questions shaping this review are as follows:  How is a Bayesian approach 
relevant to institutional research?  How can an institutional researcher leverage and incorporate 
expert information and experience into data analysis and modeling?  How can Bayesian 
networks be used in institutional research, particularly those that predict an outcome of interest? 
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Introduction to Bayesian Statistics 
A Bayesian approach to statistics is one in which statisticians attempt to describe a true 
state or event in probabilistic terms.  Contrary to the classical or frequentist approach in which 
probability is defined as the proportion of successful outcomes to number of attempts, Bayesian 
statistics views probability as degree of belief.  In other words, Bayesian probability is a measure 
of the degree of belief in the probability of specific outcome.  This degree of belief represents 
prior knowledge pertaining to the likelihood of an event, which is then updated with data 
relevant to this event in order to form a new, or posterior, belief in the probability of the same 
event occurring.  As Gill (2009) wrote, “Bayesians generally interpret probability as ‘degree of 
belief,’ meaning that prior distributions are descriptions of relative likelihoods of events based on 
the researcher’s past experience, personal intuition, or expert opinion, and posterior distributions 
are those prior distributions updated by conditioning on new observed data” (p.135). 
The following sections address the core tenets of Bayesian inferential methods, including 
an explanation of Bayes’ theorem and its role in the function of combining observed data with 
prior knowledge, a discussion of the prior distribution and how it is formed, and consideration of 
model fit.  Discussion of arguments surrounding the subjectivity of the Bayesian approach is also 
included, as well as a summary of the advantages and limitations of Bayesian methods, 
particularly within the context of social sciences, and educational and institutional research.   
Bayes’ Theorem 
Fundamentally, Bayesian methods provide a way to revise probabilities by incorporating 
new data.  Equation 1.1 demonstrates Bayes’ theorem, in which the probability of event B given 
event A (the new data) is modeled as a function of the probability of event A given event B 
multiplied by the probability of event B alone and divided by the probability of event A.   
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𝑝𝑝(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴) = 𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵)𝑝𝑝(𝐵𝐵)
𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴)  (1.1) 
Medical testing is commonly used as an illustrative tool when describing Bayes’ theorem.  
Consider an example provided by Gigerenzer (2002) concerning the efficacy of mammogram 
testing for breast cancer.  Within Gigerenzer’s example, it is presented that .8% of women in the 
general population have breast cancer.  The probability that a woman with breast cancer receives 
a positive mammogram is 90%, while the probability that a woman without breast cancer 
receives a positive mammogram is 7%.  An accurate calculation of the probability that a woman 
with a positive mammogram actually has cancer necessitates the inclusion of all of the 
information presented:  The incidence of breast cancer in the study’s population (.8%), the 
probability of a correct mammogram test (90%), and the probability of an incorrect test (7%).  
For simplicity, first consider the given information in terms of frequencies (rather than 
probabilities and percentages) as presented in Table 1.1:   
Table 1.1 
Mammogram/Breast Cancer Frequency Table 
 Cancer? Total Yes No  
Mammogram Result Positive 7 70 77 Negative 1 922 923 
Total 8 992 1000 
 
As Table 1.1 shows, .8% (8/1000) of women in the population actually have cancer.  Of 
those eight women, 88% (7/8) will receive a positive mammogram.  Seven percent of the 
remaining women in the population (70/992) will also receive a positive mammogram even 
though they don’t have cancer.  Therefore, a total of 77 women (seven of the women who 
actually do have cancer and 70 of the women who do not have cancer) will receive a positive 
mammogram.  Importantly, only seven of these 77 women actually have cancer, meaning that 
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the probability of actually having breast cancer after receiving a positive mammogram is only 
9% (7/77). 
This information is easily transferred into the variables presented in Bayes’ theorem.  
Consider p(B│A) to represent the probability of breast cancer given a positive mammogram.  
Bayes’ theorem requires that in order to determine the probability of breast cancer given a 
positive mammogram, the overall probability of breast cancer within the population, p(B) or 
.8%, be multiplied against the probability of a positive mammogram given the presence of breast 
cancer, p(A│B) or 90%, and divided by the overall probability of a positive mammogram, p(A) 
or 8%.  Substitution of these values into Bayes’ theorem results in a 9% chance that a woman 
receiving a positive mammogram actually has breast cancer.  Essentially, Bayes’ incorporation 
of the known prevalence of cancer within the given population along with test accuracy and 
sensitivity act to produce a probability of cancer given a positive mammogram.  In order words, 
a Bayesian approach investigates how the probability of one event is affected by the probability 
of another – conditional probability. 
This incorporation of conditional probability is a critical factor in Bayesian methods.  
Using the same mammogram example for illustration, there are two conditional probabilities – 
the probability of breast cancer given a positive mammogram, p(B│A), and the probability of a 
positive mammogram given the presence of breast cancer, p(A│B).  The known prevalence of 
breast cancer in the general population, p (B), is termed a “prior” probability.  The conditional 
probability of a positive mammogram given the presence of cancer, p(A│B), is termed 
“likelihood” and introduces the incorporation of new information (a positive mammogram) into 
consideration.  In other words, the likelihood portion of Bayes’ theorem estimates the effect of a 
positive mammogram on a prior belief that a person has breast cancer.  However, the 
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mammogram’s test sensitivity and accuracy are also considered in the equation, as reflected in 
the divisor.  The overall probability of receiving a positive mammogram, p (A), is a function of 
the test’s accuracy (in terms of the probability of false positive) and the test’s sensitivity (in 
terms of probability of cancer detection given the presence of cancer), both of which are 
tempered by the known prevalence (prior) of breast cancer.  The product of the prior and 
likelihood is considered the “posterior probability.”  Using Gigerenzer’s (2002) mammogram 
example, Table 1.2 illustrates the components used in Bayes’ theorem to estimate the posterior 
probability of breast cancer given a positive mammogram.    
Table 1.2 
Components of Bayes Theorem, Using Gigerenzer’s (2002) Mammogram Example 
Posterior 
Probability 
Prior Probability Likelihood 
p(B│A) 
 
Probability of 
breast cancer 
given positive 
mammogram 
 
= 
𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵)𝑝𝑝(𝐵𝐵)
𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴)  
 
 
=90%∗.8%
8%
 
 
p (B) 
 
Breast 
cancer 
prevalence 
in 
population  
p (Bno cancer ) 
 
Probability of 
not having 
breast cancer in 
general 
population 
p(A│B) 
 
Probability 
of positive 
mammogram 
given breast 
cancer 
p(A│Bno cancer) 
 
Probability of 
positive 
mammogram 
given no breast 
cancer (false 
positive) 
p(A) 
 
Probability of 
receiving 
positive 
mammogram:   
= (90% * .8%) + 
(99.2% * 7%) 
9% .8% 99.2% 90% 7% 8% 
 
Without the information provided by the mammogram, and holding all other risk factors 
constant, the only way to estimate the probability of breast cancer is to simply quote the 
prevalence within the general population.  Bayes’ theorem allows for the introduction of the new 
mammogram information (including allowances for the mammogram’s sensitivity and accuracy, 
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in terms of false negatives and false positives) to adjust the prior belief and form a more accurate 
understanding of the probability of breast cancer given a positive mammogram.  Understanding 
of the theorem and its components also allows for a more accurate assessment of what a positive 
mammogram really implies – without considering the actual prevalence of breast cancer in the 
general population, as well as the test’s sensitivity and accuracy, one would mistakenly interpret 
a positive mammogram as a 90% chance that the patient has cancer.  Incorporating all the 
information available reveals only a 9% chance that a patient with a positive mammogram has 
breast cancer.  The incorporation of new information is a major factor of what sets the Bayesian 
approach apart from frequentist techniques.   
Bayesian Priors 
Another major difference between Bayesian and frequentist approaches involves the use 
of Bayesian priors.  Put most simply, a Bayesian prior is a quantification of the researcher’s a 
priori beliefs.  In the previous example, the incidence of breast cancer in the population served as 
the prior probability.  Although there is much variation in the literature regarding nomenclature, 
Bayesian priors can be broadly categorized as uninformative or informative.  Within these 
categories are a number of subcategories, often depending on the weight assigned and source of 
the prior knowledge.  The following sections provide a general discussion of these two broad 
categories of priors.  More in depth discussion of the philosophical interpretations of 
probabilities that form the foundation of these priors follows. 
Uninformative priors.  Uninformative priors (also termed “objective,” 
“noninformative,” “flat,” “vague,” “diffuse,” and “reference,” among others, in the literature) 
provide little additional information or explanatory power, and are often employed to reflect 
objectivity (Gill, 2009).  Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004) suggested that the use of 
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uninformative prior distributions is a way “to let the data speak for themselves” (p. 62), thereby 
limiting, or even eliminating any influence of prior information on current data and posterior 
distributions.  Uninformative priors are also used in the case when more subjective prior 
distributions are unavailable or when resources involved with gathering prior information is 
deemed prohibitive (Ghosh, 2011).   
The uninformative prior employed by the earliest Bayesians is the uniform prior, in 
which all possible outcomes are equally likely (Bayes, 1763; Laplace, 1825/1902; Syversveen, 
1998).  In response to the uniform distribution’s problems with lack of invariance (variation in 
posterior distributions resulting from non-linear transformations of the same uniform 
distribution), Jeffreys (1961) proposed a prior that is invariant under reparameterization and 
incorporates Fisher’s information (Data & Ghosh, 1996).  Box and Tiao (1973), Lindley (1965), 
Press (1972), and Zellner (1971) expanded on Jeffrey’s work, demonstrated Bayesian methods’ 
ability to more efficiently address statistical problems, and set the stage for an extensive amount 
of literature exploring uninformative or objective priors (Bernardo, 2005).   
The concept of a “reference prior,” or a prior whose influence is subjugated to 
information provided by the data, is an important form of uninformative prior that emerged from 
these discussions (Berger & Bernardo, 1992).  Importantly, reference priors are understood to 
represent formal, consensus-driven functions developed among a scientific community, ensuring 
“that the information provided by the data will not be overshadowed by the scientist’s prior 
beliefs” (Bernardo, 2005, p. 3).  This understanding of uninformative priors as providing 
minimal impact is also an important distinction from earlier ideas that uninformative priors are 
attempts to represent or express ignorance (Kass & Wasserman, 1996).  One special case of 
uninformative priors, and one that results in posterior probabilities requiring careful 
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interpretation, is an “improper” prior, or one which the sum of all possible values specified by 
the prior distribution does not result in a finite value (Gelman at al., 2004).   
In the past fifty years, discussion of uninformative priors has dramatically expanded 
beyond uniform and Jeffrey’s priors.  Yang and Berger (1997) provided a catalog of 
uninformative priors, while Kass and Wasserman (1996) offered a comprehensive guide to the 
selection of the many types of uninformative priors.  The large amount of literature focused on 
the methods behind and selection of uninformative priors points toward a search for a default or 
generally agreed-upon uninformative prior that will address concerns of objectivity. 
Informative priors.  Informative priors intentionally include knowledge designed to 
influence posterior probabilities and, ultimately, statistical inference.  Press (2003) outlined the 
advantages of informative priors as follows:  Such priors are proper, act as supplementary data, 
capitalize on expert knowledge, and present an avenue for analysis when other information 
(“objective” Bayesian priors, or even a frequentist approach) is unavailable.   
Informative priors can be derived from a number of sources, often including previous 
studies and results, researcher expertise, subject-matter expertise, and mathematical convenience 
(Gill, 2009; Gelman et al., 2004).  For example, Ibrahim and Chen’s (2000) “Power Prior” is a 
form of informative prior built from historical data, in which the influence of the historical data 
is weighted based on the researcher’s belief in how closely the historical data can be tied to 
current data and inferences.  This type of informative prior is most popular in clinical settings, as 
there are often large amounts of historical data available.  A conjugate prior is an informative 
prior chosen due to its conjugacy (same distribution families) with the likelihood function, the 
use of which simplifies the calculations necessary to compute a posterior (Raiffa & Schlaifer, 
1961).  Note that the development of Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques has eased 
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the computational burden on statisticians when dealing with non-conjugate priors (Hahn, 2006).  
In following sections, this manuscript will address the formal elicitation of subject-matter 
expertise in order to develop informative priors. 
Other priors.  The literature include a number of other prior forms that do not fall neatly 
into the “informative” or “uninformative” categories, most of which were developed in the 
interest of increasing flexibility and applicability.  For example, hybrid priors combine 
informative and uninformative priors for use in hierarchical Bayesian models (Gill, 2009).  
Jaynes (1980) developed maximum entropy priors in an effort to increase flexibility in 
describing comparative levels of uncertainty.  Nonparametric-priors were developed to respond 
to problems of determining appropriate model complexity (Gershman & Blei, 2012). 
Prior Evaluation 
Although the sources of priors often depend on a researcher’s judgment, they should not 
be chosen cavalierly.  Gill (2009) encouraged explicit explanations of prior choice and 
specification, as well as analyses of a resulting model’s sensitivity to changes in the chosen prior.  
Reimherr, Meng, and Nicolae (2014) further emphasized the importance of evaluating the impact 
of an informative prior on the posterior distribution.  In other words, it is important to measure 
how much prior knowledge influences inferences and conclusions.  Additionally, the literature 
has suggested model checking (comparing observed data with model-generated data) regardless 
of informative or uninformative prior (Evans & Moshonov, 2006; Gelman, Meng, & Stern, 1996; 
Kelly & Smith, 2011; Rubin, 1984).  For example, as Rubin pointed out, the sensitivity of 
conclusions to how a Bayesian model is set up exposes scientific uncertainty – if inferences 
change based on model specifications, researchers can conclude that more information and study 
is necessary to address the uncertainty revealed.  In another form of sensitivity analysis, Berger 
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(2006) recommended a comparison of conclusions drawn from a subjective Bayesian analysis 
against those of an objective prior analysis, noting that large differences due to choice of priors 
should be discussed and further investigated and justified.  Speigelhalter and Rice (2009), 
succinctly summarized the evaluative process:  “In particular, audiences should ideally fully 
understand the contribution of the prior distribution to the conclusions, the reasonableness of the 
prior assumptions, the robustness to alternative models and priors, and the adequacy of the 
computational methods” (p.  5230). 
The incorporation of prior knowledge is a critical advantage of Bayesian methodology.  
As Gill (2009) wrote, “priors are a means of systematically incorporating existing human 
knowledge, quantitative or qualitative, into the statistical specification” (p. 138).  Ultimately, the 
selection of prior is based on a number of factors, including research question, availability of 
data, and the researcher’s experience.  More broadly, the decision of a researcher to employ 
Bayesian methodology has much to do with her interpretation of probability.  A frequentist 
interpretation of probability concludes that the results of long-run, controlled, and repeated 
experiments can eventually be interpreted as representative of the short term as well.  However, 
these types of experiments can be cost prohibitive and time consuming, and are typically 
unrealistic within behavioral and social sciences.  The Bayesian approach to probability offers an 
alternative in which probability represents a degree of belief, and prior probabilities reflect this 
degree of belief a priori to any new evidence.  As discussed in depth below, this degree of belief 
is also termed “subjective probability.” 
Subjective Probability 
At the root of any discussion regarding the use of Bayesian inferential techniques lies the 
idea of subjective probability.  In their discussions of the philosophical foundations of 
10 
 
probability, both Weatherford’s (1982) and Gillies’ (2000) definitions of subjective probability 
are remarkably similar: Weatherford defined subjective probability as “the degree of belief of a 
given person at a given time” (p. 220), and Gillies stated that subjective probability theory 
“identifies probability with the degree of belief of a particular individual” (p. 1).  These 
definitions are mostly based on the work of subjective theorist Bruno de Finetti, who provided 
the philosophical and mathematical groundwork for subjective probability with his definition of 
probability as “a measure of a degree of belief attributed to the various possible alternatives” (de 
Finetti, 1972, p. 147-148).  Further, de Finetti proposed the modification of degree of belief 
should be the result of observation of prior events – in short, learning from experience (Cifarelli 
& Regazzini, 1996).  Subjective probability was further explored through the work of Kyburg 
and Smokler (1964), Luce and Suppes (1965), Ramsey (1931), Savage (1954), and Savage, 
Hacking, and Shimony (1967).   
It is important to note that de Finetti’s and others’ concept of subjective probability was 
not without limits.  de Finetti likened the limitation of degree of belief to a gambling situation – 
“…the degree of probability attributed by an individual to a given event is revealed by the 
conditions under which he would be disposed to bet on that event” (de Finetti, 1937/1964, p. 
101).  Additionally, de Finetti included discussion of the necessary conditions under which 
degrees of belief could serve as probabilities:  Degrees of belief are measurable and coherent, or 
rational, ensuring a grounding in reality (Weatherford, 1982).  Other philosophers have 
expounded on the circumstances necessary for, and influencing, degrees of belief.  Like de 
Finetti, Ramsey (1931) employed gambling allusions (avoidance of falling victim to a Dutch 
Book, in which a better irrationally agrees to a bet in which he is guaranteed to lose) to illustrate 
how adherence to the axioms of probability is critical in determining and acting on degree of 
11 
 
belief.  Bonjour (1985), Dawid (1982), and Lewis (1946) put forth that, in the instance of two or 
more pieces of information being used to form a belief, confidence in that belief increases 
according the congruence, or coherence, of the pieces of information.  In their discussion of the 
epistemology underlying the use of probabilities in Bayesian methods, Bovens and Hartmann 
(2003) proposed three conditions thought to influence degree of belief:  The degree to which the 
information forming the belief was expected, the reliability of the information, and the coherence 
of the information.  In summary, while emphasizing the personalistic and subjective properties of 
probability, subjective theorists recognize the necessity of coherency and consistency in the 
formation of belief.   
Within the realm of Bayesian statistical methods of inference, subjective probability is 
important when considering the initial probability assigned to a hypothesis (the Bayesian prior).  
As discussed in earlier sections of this manuscript, a researcher using Bayesian inference first 
establishes a belief surrounding the probability of an event occurring, and then uses available 
data to update that prior probability and form a posterior probability.  Recall that there are 
generally two types of priors – uninformative and informative – and that uninformative priors are 
typically considered “objective.”  It can be argued that an informative prior can be considered 
fundamentally subjective, as it represents a degree of belief given current and situational 
knowledge, experience, reasoning, and logic.  The subjective properties of the prior belief sound 
very similar to the ideas behind constructivism and phenomenology, such as the understanding 
that reality is constructed and meaning is made through individuals’ first-person experiences and 
interactions with others (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007).  Curlette (2006) suggested that this places 
Bayesian methods incorporating a subjective prior belief within a phenomenological framework.  
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This use of subjective priors introduces a controversial aspect of Bayesian methodology – the 
conflict over subjectivity. 
Objectivity vs. Subjectivity 
Arguments concerning the roles of objectivity and subjectivity within scientific research 
are not uncommon – for example, consider the qualitative versus quantitative “Paradigm Wars” 
in educational research (Eisner & Peshkin, 1990; Gage, 1989; Guba, 1990).  A criticism of 
Bayesians’ acceptance of subjective probability is that it defies the fundamental objectivity 
embraced by the mainstream understanding of the scientific method.  In his article, The Case for 
Objective Bayesian Analysis (2006), Berger acknowledged the fact that statistical methods are 
understood to be a tool for producing unbiased, objective validation of scientific results, and 
proposes that wider acceptance and valuation of Bayesian methods is predicated on the 
appearance of objectivity, particularly within a regulatory climate.  The vast amount of literature 
and studies addressing the choices of uninformative priors (see “Background – Uninformative 
Priors”) speaks to this drive to legitimate Bayesian methodology through a focus on “objective” 
priors.  There are even attempts to propose more objective informative priors.  For example, 
Berger and Sun (2008) recommended a set of informative priors that, based on parameters of 
interest, can be used as default priors – prescriptive/standardized priors given the research 
question.  Some would suggest that these prescriptive priors remove any researcher bias or 
subjectivity in the actual choice of prior (Lenk & Orme, 2009).    
However, it can also be argued that, regardless of approach, there is no such thing as pure 
objectivity – researchers’ choices regarding research questions, methodologies, and analysis 
techniques could all be considered subjective choices influenced by experience, habit, etc. 
(Berger, 2006; Gill, 2009; Hennig, 2009; Press & Tanur, 2001; Stevens & O’Hagan, 2002; 
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Weatherford, 1982).  D’Agostini (2001) elaborated on this idea by referencing Bayesians’ 
requirement for coherence in subjective probabilities:   
Once coherence is included in the subjective Bayesian theory, it becomes evident that 
'subjective' cannot be confused with 'arbitrary', since all ingredients for assessing 
probability must be taken into account, including the knowledge that somebody else 
might assess different odds for the same events.  Indeed, the coherent subjectivist is far 
more responsible (and more ‘objective’, in the sense that ordinary parlance gives to this 
word) than those who blindly use standard 'objective' methods.  (p. 25) 
In other words, the process of appropriately incorporating subjective Bayesian priors – ensuring 
coherence and adherence to the laws of probability, as well as accounting for the conditions 
affecting degree of belief – introduces even greater levels transparency and thoughtfulness than 
typical frequentist methods.  
In summary, an important aspect of Bayesian inference is the idea that the prior belief in 
the probability of an event occurring is often subjective, as it reflects degree of belief based on 
specific, often individual, circumstances.  This subjectivity is not only accepted, but valued in 
eliciting expert opinions to form prior probabilities.  A Bayesian approach such as this serves 
two purposes:  It accepts that the ideal of purely objective scientific research is unrealistic, and it 
does not waste any available, and potentially enlightening, information.  Following a 
summarizing discussion contrasting and comparing Bayesian versus frequentist approaches, the 
process of formally eliciting informative, subjective prior probabilities for use in Bayesian 
inference will be described and reviewed.   
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Comparing Bayesian and Frequentist Approaches 
In his address to a group of statisticians, particle physicists, astrophysicists, and 
cosmologists, Bradley Efron (2003), former President of the American Statistical Association, 
addressed the conflict between Bayesian and frequentist factions as follows: 
The Bayesian-frequentist argument is certainly a long-lived one, even by the standards of 
philosophy.  It reflects, I believe, two quite different attitudes toward the scientific 
process:  the cautious frequentist desire for objectivity and consensus, versus the 
individual scientist trying aggressively to make the best sense of past data and the best 
choice for future direction.  (p. 1) 
While Efron’s summation was profound and cogent, there are a number of differences 
between the two methodologies influencing their different approaches to the scientific process.  
Spiegelhalter and Rice (2009) wrote that the main difference between frequentist and Bayesian 
approaches to inference is that “Bayesians make statements about the relative evidence for 
parameter values given a dataset, while frequentists compare the relative chance of datasets 
given a parameter value” (p. 5230).  More concisely, Bayesians consider the probability of a 
hypothesis given data, while frequentists consider the data, given a hypothesis.  In other words, 
Bayesians consider all information or evidence available to draw conclusions about a certain 
parameter, while frequentists evaluate how well certain data sets conform to a hypothesized 
parameter.  Encompassed within this overall distinction are a number of other differences 
described below. 
Interpretations of Probability 
As discussed earlier, Bayesian methods employ an understanding of probability as a 
degree of belief.  In the frequentist approach, probability represents the likelihood that an event 
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will occur in a large number of repeated trials – as Gill (2009) wrote, “…frequentists see 
probability measure as a property of the outside world and Bayesians view probability as a 
personal internalization of observed uncertainty” (p. 27).  This differing interpretation is 
particularly notable due to the use of prior probabilities in Bayesian approaches – the inclusion 
of prior probability distributions to represent a state of knowledge prior to the introduction of 
new data is in direct contrast to the frequentist idea that there is some fixed, unchanging 
probability of events that can be calculated through frequency counts of long-run experiments. 
Hypothesis Testing/Inference 
Frequentist hypothesis testing centers around the work of Neyman and Pearson (1933), in 
which researchers choose between a null and alternative hypothesis based on the calculation and 
acceptance or rejection of false-positive or false-error rates.  Neyman and Pearson posited that a 
greater amount of objectivity is achieved by limiting error through replication and deductive 
reasoning, and alluded to a trade-off between objectivity and drawing conclusions from a single 
experiment when they wrote: 
…no test based upon a theory of probability can by itself provide any valuable evidence 
of the truth or falsehood of a hypothesis.  But we may look at the purpose of tests from 
another viewpoint.  Without hoping to know whether each separate hypothesis is true or 
false, we may search for rules to govern our behavior with regard to them, in following 
which we insure that, in the long run of experience, we shall not often be wrong.  (p. 291) 
Offered as a measure of evidence against the null, and not originally intended to be used 
in inference, Fisher’s p value is often incorporated into classical hypothesis testing (Fisher 1925; 
Fisher 1935; Fisher 1956).  There is a large body of literature addressing the problems with the 
widespread misinterpretation of p values in significance testing, in which the authors point out 
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that incorrect use of p values often involves the conflation of p values with Type 1 error rates, or 
conceptual errors in which p values serve as probability statements describing the likelihood of a 
hypothesis (Carver, 1978; Cohen, 1994; Dixon, 2003; Gelman & Loken, 2014; Gigerenzer, 
1993; Hubbard & Lindsey, 2008; Johansson, 2011; Royall, 2000; Wagenmakers, 2007, etc.).  
More relevant to this discussion, however, is why p values and hypothesis testing have been 
combined into this widespread hybrid method.  Both hypothesis testing and p values were 
proposed in response to a culture valuing increased objectivity and rigorous quantitative methods 
(Marks, 1997; Matthews, 1995; Porter, 1995).  However, with Neyman-Pearson hypothesis 
testing’s focus on controlling error rates over the long-run and the limitation of Fisher’s p value 
to only indicating evidence against a null hypotheses, Goodman (1999a) suggested that the 
coupling of the two approaches is the result of researchers’ understandable desire to be able to 
draw conclusions from a single experiment using “objective” methodology.  In other words, the 
combination of hypothesis testing and p values presents researchers with a seemingly viable, 
although often conceptually incorrect, platform for “evidenced-based” research.   
Contrastingly, Bayesian methods do offer a formal avenue towards quantifying statistical 
evidence for or against a hypothesis.  Unlike null hypothesis significance testing, a Bayesian 
approach can be used to calculate the probability that, given data or evidence, a hypothesis is true 
or untrue.  This is done using the “Bayes factor,” the likelihood ratio included in Bayes’ theorem 
(Jeffreys, 1961; Robert, 2007).  The Bayes factor is a ratio comparing the probability of data 
given one hypothesis (D|H1) with the probability of data given an alternative hypothesis (D|H2), 
As shown in Equation 1.2, the Bayes Factor essentially indicates the weight of the data in 
altering prior odds of a hypothesis into posterior odds.   
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𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝑝𝑝(𝐷𝐷|𝐻𝐻1)
𝑝𝑝(𝐷𝐷|𝐻𝐻2) (1.2) 
How closely the prior resembles observed data will determine support or rejection of hypothesis 
being tested. 
Using the familiar parlance of null hypothesis significance testing, the Bayes factor can 
be used to compute how much evidence (in the form of data) revises the probability that a null 
hypothesis is true – in essence, the Bayes factor evaluates the predictive accuracy of the null and 
alternative hypotheses.  This is an important distinction between frequentist and Bayesian 
hypothesis testing:  While the objective of frequentist hypothesis testing is to consider the 
probability of data given a null hypothesis (and accept or reject that null hypothesis based on a 
pre-determined threshold of acceptable risk that the observed data are due to chance alone), 
Bayesian hypothesis testing aims to evaluate a hypothesis given data (Kass & Raftery, 1995).  
Kass and Raftery (1995) offered a comprehensive summation of the uses for, 
interpretations of, and advantages and disadvantages of Bayes factors in hypothesis testing.  For 
examples of studies incorporating Bayesian hypothesis testing for comparing models see 
Goodman (199b), Li, Zeng, & Yu (2014), Morey & Rouder (2011), and Ranganathan, Spaiser, 
Mann, & Sumpter, (2014).  Note that there is also substantial literature surrounding 
inconsistencies between conclusions drawn from Bayesian and frequentist hypothesis testing on 
similar data (Berger & Berry, 1988; Berger & Sellke, 1987; Casella & Berger, 1987; Moreno & 
Girón, 2006, Rocha, Loschi, & Franco, 2011; Samaniego & Reneau, 1994).   
A final note on the differences in hypothesis testing using frequentist and Bayesian 
approaches:  The oft mentioned argument against Bayesian’s incorporation of subjective 
probabilities is highlighted when considering hypothesis testing.  As Berger and Berry (1988) 
emphasized, there are a number of subjective choices made in hypothesis testing – on the 
18 
 
frequentist side, acceptability of error rates, p values and statistical power are all  subjective 
choices.  Further, both Bayesians and frequentists make subjective choices regarding the 
alternative hypotheses with which to compare the null.  However, as both Wagenmakers, Lee, 
Lodewyckx, and Iverson (2008) and Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, and Iverson (2009) argued, 
at least these subjective qualities of hypothesis testing are openly acknowledged, and thus 
discussed and critiqued, within a Bayesian approach.   
Treatment of Prior Information 
As discussed earlier, a fundamental property of Bayesian methodology is the formal 
incorporation of prior information.  Within the frequentist context, the influence of prior 
information is avoided in the interest of ensuring objectivity.  Reviews of literature often cite the 
methodologies and conclusions of similar studies, and perhaps inform a priori hypotheses, 
methodology choice, and model design.  Meta-analysis synthesizes information from multiple 
sources (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009), and there are information theory 
techniques (Akaike, 1992; Burnham and Anderson, 2001) that allow for the comparison and 
combination of a number of different models.  However, these frequentist approaches do not 
allow for the explicit introduction of any prior information into analysis of any new data.  
A large component of frequentist angst over Bayesian methodology is centered on the 
idea that there is no guarantee that the prior information used by separate researchers examining 
the same question is going to be identical or even similar.  This is especially true within more 
“subjective” Bayesian analysis, as it allows for the incorporation of prior data that is not easily or 
universally quantifiable from actual prior experience.  As Efron (2013) wrote, “the 
Bayesian/frequentist controversy centers on the use of Bayes’ rule in the absence of genuine 
prior experience” (p. 133).  The resulting threat to replicability and generalizability is contrary to 
19 
 
frequentist approaches focusing on repeated tests over time in controlled environments.  
However, it could be argued that such controlled environments are often unrealistic and that 
there is as much subjectivity involved in the design of frequentist studies as there is in the use of 
Bayesian priors.  As Poirer (1988) pointed out, it is the formal quantification and incorporation 
of prior beliefs that brings about increased levels of transparency:   
…I believe subjective prior beliefs should play a formal role so that it is easier to 
investigate their impact on the results of the analysis.  Bayesians must live with such 
honesty whereas those who introduce such beliefs informally need not.  (p. 130) 
Additionally, recall that a number of Bayesian scholars recommend evaluation of the influence 
of prior information as a critical step in Bayesian methodology (Berger, 1994; Berger, 2006; 
Gelman, Meng, & Stern, 1996; Gill, 2009; Reimeherr et al., 2014; Rubin, 1984; Spiegelhalter & 
Rice, 2009).  Through the analysis of the sensitivity to and robustness of Bayesian inference to 
the prior, valuable conversation is added to the literature surrounding a problem that is otherwise 
ignored in frequentist methods.   
Even given the increased attention to and discussion of the Bayesian approach to 
statistics, frequentist approaches remain the dominant techniques first taught to students of 
statistics.  In addition to the controversies over the interpretation of probability, prioritization and 
understanding of objectivity, and treatment of prior information, Oakes (1986), Schmidt (1996), 
and Tversky and Kahneman (1971) suggested additional reasons for the tenacity of researcher 
attachment to frequentist techniques like null hypothesis significance testing even in light of 
well-documented criticisms.  The reliance on significance testing is particularly true within the 
social sciences (Gigerenzer, 2004; Harlow, Mulaik, & Steiger, 1997; Hoekstra, Finch, Kiers, & 
Johnson, 2012; Kline, 2004).  While there does appear to be a general movement away from 
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significance testing and p values in the more recent literature, the alternatives often offered are 
still based within the frequentist framework.  For example, the latest version of the authority in 
social science research publication, the American Psychological Association’s Publication 
Manual (2013) , encouraged authors to view null hypothesis statistical testing as “but a starting 
point” (p. 33) and to seek out and report other frequentist results such as effect sizes and 
confidence intervals.  A number of authors have extolled the use of alternatives such as 
confidence intervals to null hypothesis significance testing within the social sciences (Cumming, 
2014; Fidler & Loftus, 2009; Hoekstra, Morey, Rouder & Wagenmakers, 2014), and Gigerenzer 
(2004) and Finch et al. (2004) suggested that editorial support of alternatives to null hypothesis 
statistical testing is a necessary but insufficient environment to foster alternatives.  The editors of 
the Journal of Advanced Academics recently revealed new editorial policies expressing 
preference for effect sizes and confidence intervals, as well as encouragement of replication of 
other studies, over significance testing (McBee & Matthews, 2014).  Once again, these are all 
frequentist alternatives. 
However, Bayes’ popularity is growing in increasing numbers of disciplines – as 
Andrews and Baguley (2013) pointed out, Bayesian methods were present in 20% of articles in 
the most highly respected statistics journals.  As its popularity grows, Bayesian methodology 
will face increased attention, scrutiny, and inevitable disagreements among its own practitioners.  
For example, within the current overall Bayesian camp, there are ongoing dialogs and 
philosophical conflicts surrounding “practical Bayesianism,” the practice of using Bayesian 
techniques without a commitment to or adoption of the Bayesian philosophy of science 
(Boorsboom & Haig, 2013; Gelman & Shalizi, 2013; Kruschke, 2013; Morey, Romeijn & 
Rouder, 2013).  Authors like Dennis (1996), while acknowledging advantages in Bayesian 
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techniques, expressed reluctance in adopting an approach until more discipline-specific 
researchers analyze, discuss and test Bayesian methodologies.  Further, the widespread 
consideration and discussions of articles like Gorard’s (2014) and Ioannidis’ (2005) indictments 
of research methodologies and publication bias hints that the scientific community is open to a 
diversity ideas and approaches.  This openness, along with increased external and internal 
examinations of Bayesian methodology, can only help to improve and move forward scientific 
inquiry. 
Bayesian Methods and Social Science/Educational Research 
Bolstad (2007) succinctly summarized the advantages of a Bayesian approach, noting the 
following benefits:  The formal consideration of prior information, easily interpretable results in 
the form of probability statements, and one universal tool (Bayes’ theorem) that is applicable to 
every question or situation.  As noted throughout earlier discussion, hypothesis testing and the 
use of p values is commonly misunderstood and misused.  Additionally, hypothesis testing 
requires of researchers a number of judgments and decisions surrounding rejection/acceptance 
thresholds, model design, statistic used, etc.  In contrast, Bayesian methods require only one 
decision in the choice of a prior.  Outside of these advantages of simplicity and universality, 
however, Bayesian methods are particularly amenable to social science research.  Gill (2009) 
extolled the suitability of Bayesian methods to social and behavioral research by noting that 
many of the overarching questions and topics within the field of human behavior simply don’t fit 
within the frequentist (long run probability and replicability) paradigm:  “Ideas like ‘personal 
utility,’ ‘legislative ideals points,’ ‘cultural influence,’ ‘mental states,’ ‘personality types,’ and 
‘principal-agent goal discrepancy’ do not exist as parametrically uniform phenomena in some 
physically tangible manner” (p. 26).  These questions of human behavior are difficult to 
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generalize and measure at the individual level, thus there is a unique amount of uncertainty 
within social science research.  As Montgomery and Nyhan (2010), Raftery (1996), Rubin 
(1984), and Western (1999) explained, Bayesian methods are well-adapted for handling and 
expressing uncertainty.  Gill further pointed out that the influence of social norms is particularly 
important within social science research, especially in terms of biases, judgments and 
assumptions brought to the research by researchers, and that Bayesian’s use of subjective 
probability and a formal prior is particularly suited to transparently addressing this influence.  
Among his arguments in favor of using Bayesian methods for social science research, Raftery 
(1995) noted that social science often uses large data sets especially sensitive to p values and 
subsequent rejection of null hypotheses, and Western (1999) highlighted Bayesian’s handling of 
accounting for uncertainty as a fundamental reason of its compatibility to social science research.  
Berk, Western, and Weiss (1995) and Gorard (2014) pointed out that the underlying assumptions 
required for significance testing, particularly that of selecting and comparing truly random 
samples against a known population, are typically unmet by social science data.  Further, due to 
ethical and logistical complications, generating random samples (and ultimately using analytical 
techniques assuming random sampling) within social science research is often impossible.  
Ranganathan, Spaiser, Mann, and Sumpter (2014) highlighted the efficiency in comparing Bayes 
factors in model selection in the social sciences, and numerous other authors (Bolstad, 2007; 
Gelman, 2008a; Gelman et al., 2004; Gill, 2009) discussed how Bayesian methods are suited for 
the types of hierarchical modeling often  encountered in the social sciences.   
Bayesian Methods and Institutional Research 
Chapter Two of this manuscript involves the development of a predictive retention model 
using a Bayesian approach.  In addition to being considered social science and educational 
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research, this type of activity is more specifically categorized as “Institutional Research,” a 
specialized type of educational research performed within educational institutions used to inform 
decision- and policy-making within that specific institution or system of institutions.  
Institutional Research often deals with large sets of population data, as analysts have access to 
current and historical information databases, and while experimental designs are not unheard of 
within institutional research, the aforementioned difficulties of random selection and controlled 
trials within educational research make them difficult and rare.  Additionally, the data available 
to institutional researchers often simply do not meet the assumptions required in the frequentist 
paradigm – as Luan and Zhao (2006) wrote, “Institutional researchers often feel frustrated as 
assumptions for valid statistical inferences are often violated with dealing with real institutional 
research problems and when messy, ambiguous, and incomplete data are present” (p. 117).  
Bayes’ comfort with uncertainty and the explicit use of formal priors within Bayesian methods 
provide an alternative avenue for institutional researchers – calling on the expertise and 
experience of teachers, administrators and others, institutional researchers can incorporate this 
knowledge into formal priors that can then be combined with institutional data to generate a 
posteriori conclusions.  Additionally, the use of formal priors requires institutional researchers to 
unambiguously address and justify potential bias and assumptions.  
A major function of institutional research is providing decision-support to administrators, 
and as Bernardo and Smith (2000) and Robert (2007) pointed out, Bayesian methods are 
particularly helpful in decision-making.  Bayesian approaches towards decision-making and 
decision support, mostly through the use of Bayesian networks, have been widely employed in 
medical and engineering fields – see Berner (2006), Greenes (2014), Lucas, van der Gaag, Abu-
Hanna (2004), and for examples of medical uses and Li, Han and Kang (2013), Rezaee, Raie, 
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Nadi, and Ghidary (2011), Swiler, (2006), and Zhu and Deshmukh (2003) for examples within 
engineering.  However, such approaches to institutional, and even more broadly, educational, 
research are less common in the literature.  Bekele and Menzel (2005) used Bayesian networks to 
predict student performance, noting that they chose a Bayesian approach due to its specialized 
skill in handling and expressing uncertainty.  Loeb (2003) incorporated Bayesian estimation in 
hierarchical linear modeling to explore gender equity in faculty salaries, and Laru, Naykki & 
Jarvela (2012) used Bayesian methods to identify predictors of learning outcomes.  In the larger 
field of educational research, Vomlel (2004), Wainer, Wang, Skorupski and Bradlow (2005), and 
Ricketts and Moyeed (2011) incorporated Bayesian methods in the evaluation and improvement 
of educational testing, and a number of authors have explored the role of Bayesian methods in 
Item Response Theory (Gao and Chen, 2005; Johnson, 2013; May, 2006; Almond, Mislevy 
Steinberg, Yan, & Williamson, 2015).  A more extensive review of Bayesian networks in 
institutional research is included in subsequent sections.   
In summary, a Bayesian approach is particularly suited to institutional research for a 
number of reasons.  The use of formal priors allows for the incorporation of additional sources of 
knowledge or experience, as well as the transparent acknowledgement and discussion of biases, 
subjectivity, and assumptions involved in the research process.  Additionally, a Bayesian 
approach embraces the high levels of uncertainty and unmet frequentist assumptions frequently 
encountered in institutional research topics.  Finally, the qualitative and social science research 
skills of institutional researchers are featured during the process of formal elicitation of Bayesian 
priors.  Chapter Two will incorporate Bayesian methods through the creation and use of a 
Bayesian network using formal elicitation, and the following sections will provide a background 
and literature review of these two subjects, with a focus on applicability to institutional research. 
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Elicitation of Subjective Probabilities from Experts in Order to Form Bayesian Priors 
Often, we want to make use of the opinion of a person whom we regard as an expert.  
Does the weatherman think it will rain, the doctor that we shall soon get well, the lawyer 
that it would be better to settle out of court, or the geologist that there might be lots of oil 
at the bottom of a deep hole?  (Savage, 1971, p. 795) 
The main idea behind the Bayesian approach to statistics is that researchers revise their 
understands or beliefs of certain outcomes in light of new evidence – Bayesian statisticians 
combine both prior information and new data through the use of Bayes’ theorem in order to 
estimate the probability of an outcome (Bolstad, 2007).  One of the most exciting aspects of 
employing Bayesian methodology in institutional research is the use of experts’ beliefs to 
quantify and use prior information.  The elicitation of experts’ beliefs introduces a qualitative 
aspect to research design, often in the form of interviewing, and the information gathered is then 
quantified and used in computing the probability of studied events occurring.  Not only does this 
methodology enhance potential for increased insight into current educational and institutional 
research questions, but it also introduces an opportunity to further explore and realize the 
benefits of mixed-methods research.  This section focuses on the gathering of experts’ opinions 
using various elicitation techniques, including a discussion of the types of probabilities being 
elicited, elicitation best practices and challenges, and the role of subjective probability elicitation 
within institutional research.  
Examples of expert elicitations used to form Bayesian priors can be found in a number of 
fields, including business (Bajari & Ye, 2003; Gustafson et al., 2003; Lagerstrӧm, Johnson, 
Hӧӧk, & Kӧnig, 2009), clinical settings (Johnson, Tomlinson, Hawker, Granton, & Feldman, 
2010; Prajna et al., 2013; Spiegelhalter, Abrams, & Myles, 2004; White, Carpenter, Evans, & 
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Schroter, 2007), engineering (Dogan, 2012; Jorgensen, Teigen, & Molokken, 2004; Kaplan, 
1992), communications (Vogelgesang & Scharkow, 2009), information security (Ryan, 
Mazzuchi, Ryan, de la Cruz, & Cooke, 2012), politics (Buckley, 2004), public policy (Morgan, 
2014), and, most commonly, ecology (Choy, O’Leary, & Mengersen, 2009; Kuhnert, Martin, 
Mengersen, & Possingham, 2005; Murray et al., 2009; O’Neil, Osborn, Hulme, Lorenzoni, & 
Watkinson, 2008).  While less common, the literature does include expert elicitations within the 
educational field.  For example, Bosworth, Gingiss, Porthoff and Roberts-Gray (1999), asked 
health education experts to estimate the likelihood of a program’s successful implementation.  In 
the narrower field of institutional research, Subbiah, Srinivasan, and Shanthi (2011) discussed 
the potential advantages of using expert-elicited Bayesian priors in enrollment management.  
However, the majority of educational research studies incorporating Bayesian methodologies do 
not include elicitation.   
Elicitation and Uncertainty 
Expert elicitation involves the quantification and transformation of experts’ opinions into 
subjective probabilities used to inform a prior probability distribution which is then updated with 
new data using Bayesian techniques.  Just as discussion of definitions of probability is 
fundamental to the differences between frequentist and Bayesian approaches, distinguishing 
between a frequentist and Bayesian definition of probability is important in elicitation.  As a 
main goal of expert elicitation is to quantify uncertainty regarding some particular event or 
variable over which an expert can provide better information than any other source, it is 
understood that the expert is providing personal, or subjective, probabilities.  Expert elicitation 
involves the gathering of experts’ degrees of belief in some uncertain event or value.  O’Hagan et 
al. (2006) explained this further by placing expert elicitation within the context of uncertainty: In 
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contrast to aleatory, or random, uncertainty, expert elicitation deals with epistemic (imperfect 
knowledge) uncertainty, in that experts are asked to weigh in on the uncertainty related to a 
unique or specific event on which there is imperfect knowledge.  In other words, experts are 
asked to make judgments or decisions under conditions of uncertainty.  Ideally, these judgments 
and decisions under uncertainty adhere to normative theories of decision making as described by 
de Finetti (1973), DeGroot (1970), and Savage (1954), which basically state that an expert’s 
degree of belief is a function of rationality, maximizing rewards, and adherence to the axioms of 
probability.  Normative decision theory also states that probabilities are an adequate, or even 
ideal, avenue towards expressing uncertainty (Cooke, 1991).  In short, the probabilities elicited 
in an expert elicitation are assumed to be a rational, coherent representation of an expert’s 
uncertainty.  However, as discussed in the upcoming discussion of best practices in elicitation, 
the assumption that elicited probabilities are actually those described by the normative theories 
of decision making is often challenged.   
Elicitation Best Practices 
Kadane and Wolfson’s “Experiences in Elicitation” (1998) is used by many researchers 
incorporating expert elicited Bayesian priors as a guide to “best practices” (Garthwaite, Kadane, 
& O’Hagan, 2005; Gill, 2009; O’Hagan et al., 2006).  The authors defined a successful 
elicitation as one in which the researcher assures the process is “as easy as possible for subject-
matter experts to tell us what they believe, in probabilistic terms, while reducing how much they 
need to know about probability theory to do so” (p. 4).  Other authors who have provided step-
by-step guidance in the elicitation process in numerous settings include Clemen and Reilly 
(2001), Cooke and Goossens (2004), Garthwaite et al. (2005), Meyer and Booker (2001), Phillips 
(1999), Shephard and Kirkwood (1994), and Walls and Quigley (2001).  A review of these works 
28 
 
highlights the following major stages of the elicitation process:  Preparation of the 
researcher/elicitor, selection of expert(s), training of expert(s), confirmed understanding or 
acceptance of the model for which judgments are being elicited, and the actual elicitation, 
including assessment and feedback.  These practices serve to provide the expert ample 
opportunity to adequately express her beliefs while also allowing the researcher to gather as 
much helpful information as possible and verify her own understanding of what the expert is 
trying to communicate.  Chapter Two of this manuscript will incorporate the guidance of Kadane 
and Wolfson and the later work of O’Hagan et al. (2006) in a formal elicitation of undergraduate 
retention experts. 
In terms of the actual information being elicited, best practices center around the research 
question, the type of prior desired, and the expert(s).  There exists a large amount of literature 
discussing individuals’ ability (and, more often, lack thereof) to estimate or judge statistical 
quantities – see Beach and Swenson (1966), Erlick (1964), and Shuford (1961) as examples – 
that speaks to the necessity of careful consideration paid to the types of summary statistics being 
elicited.  Findings reported by Wallsten, Budescu, Rapoport, Zwick, & Forsyth (1986) and 
Wardekker, van der Sluijs, Janssen, Kloprogge, & Petersen (2008) suggested that elicitations 
cannot simply rely on experts using words like “likely” or “unlikely” to qualify uncertainty – 
elicitations typically involve quantification.  Elicitations involving the gathering of a single 
probability (see Spetzler & Staël von Holstein, 1975) can be enhanced by asking the experts to 
consider probability judgments within the context of gambling (Clemen & Reilly, 2001; Renooij, 
2001), relative frequency (Price, 1998), and probability scales (Wang, Dash & Druzdel, 2002).  
Winkler (1967) provided an introduction to eliciting probability distributions, although 
elicitations within the social sciences seeking probability distributions more often use indirect 
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methods (Gill, 2009).  For example, Bedrick, Christensen, and Johnson (1997), Higgins, Huxley, 
Wapenaar, and Green (2014), and O’Hagan et al. (2006) asked experts to express their beliefs 
through quantiles or intervals which were retroactively fitted to probability distributions.  
Chaloner and Duncan (1987) discussed the elicitation of multinomial distributions, and 
Garthwaite and Dickey (1992) and Garthwaite, Al-Awadhi, Elfadaly, and Jenkinson (2013) 
addressed the elicitation of summary statistics related to regression.  Garthwaite et al. (2005) 
provided recommendations for multivariate elicitations, noting that the joint probability 
distribution required in such situations is particularly challenging, while Goldstein (2004) and 
Oakley and O’Hagan (2007) explored nonparametric approaches to incorporating expert 
elicitations as Bayesian priors.   
In many cases, information from multiple experts will be used to form a Bayesian prior, 
and a number of authors have addressed and evaluated methods of combining expert opinions in 
prior elicitation – see Clemen and Winkler (1999) and Hammitt and Zhang (2013) as examples.  
The aggregation of expert opinions is completed mathematically or behaviorally.  For example, 
the mathematical combination of expert judgments can be accomplished through the use of 
averaging (Burgman et al., 2011; Cooke, 1991), pooling (French, 1985; Genest & Zidek, 1986) 
or even using Bayesian approaches (Albert et al., 2012; Roback & Givens, 2001).  Behavioral 
approaches to combining expert judgments involve interaction and consensus building among 
the experts.  Practices like the Delphi method (Dalkey, 1969) and Nominal Group Technique 
(Delbecq, Van De Ven, & Gustafson, 1975) are often used in an effort to counteract challenges 
of bullying and “group think” often encountered in group interactions (Clemen & Winkler, 
1999).  Each approach has drawbacks and challenges, which, as with many of the best practices 
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related to expert elicitation, have much to do with the research question or topic and choice of 
expert.   
A final best practice related to expert elicitation involves testing the elicited information’s 
accuracy in terms of the extent to which it matches experts’ true knowledge or beliefs as well as 
reality.  Garthwaite et al. (2005) recommended examination of the coherence of elicited 
probabilities, as well as offering feedback to the experts in an effort to clarify or correct for 
inconsistencies.  The authors also suggested analyses of the sensitivity of elicited probabilities or 
distributions to changes in assumptions or other model parameters.  In cases where data 
reflecting actual events are available, scoring rules, in which experts are awarded a score based 
on the quality of calibration of their judgments with reality, can be used to judge and even 
improve the accuracy of elicited probabilities (Gneiting & Raftery, 2007; Matheson & Winkler, 
1976; Savage, 1971).  Building on the use of scoring rules, Cooke (1991) recommended 
gathering multiple expert opinions, weighting each expert’s assessment based on the 
performance scores, and then producing a weighted synthesized score.   
Challenges of Expert Elicitation 
There are a number of challenges related to expert elicitation, the majority of which stem 
from the design of the elicitation protocol.  As a goal of elicitation is to allow the expert to 
communicate her most accurate degree of belief, it is important to design an elicitation protocol 
that strives to minimize the introduction of bias or other confounding influences on an expert’s 
true degree of belief.  Articles designed to serve as guides to designing and carrying out 
elicitations (Choy et al., 2009; Jenkinson, 2005) emphasized the importance of carefully 
considering and articulating a research question and elicitation protocol as critical parts of the 
elicitation process.  This is similar to the advice found in texts directed towards standard 
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qualitative research (see Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, and Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009), and it is 
recommended that thoughtful and measured attention to the various considerations (costs, 
timing, expert statistical background, etc.) is given in the design of the elicitation protocol. 
Authors studying calibration report that the quality of correspondence between elicited 
subjective probabilities and actual occurrences has much to do with the way the elicitation is 
conducted (Beach & Braun, 1994; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982; Ronis & Yates, 
1987).  Therefore, consideration of the findings of the larger field of calibration research into the 
design of an elicitation protocol is one helpful way to increase the likelihood of superior 
elicitation.  For example, Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbӧlting (1991), Gigerenzer (1996) and 
Thomson, Ӧnkal-Atay, Pollock, and Macaulay (2003) found that task characteristics, or how 
experts are asked to respond, can influence the extremity and over/under-confidence of elicited 
probabilities.  Carlson (1993) and Wright and Ayton (1992) suggested that the timing of the 
event for which probabilities are being sought affects calibration, while Bornstein and 
Zickafoose (1999), and Jonsson and Allwood (2003), and West and Stanovich (1997) found that 
the knowledge domain of an elicitation influences judgment.  Additionally, the definition of 
“expertise” is not always universal (Caley et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2012), and researchers 
should recognize that subject-matter expertise does not guarantee skill in expressing probabilistic 
beliefs.  In their guide to expert elicitation, Kuhnert, Martin, and Griffiths (2010) differentiated 
between two styles of elicitation activities – direct, in which experts are asked to provide 
opinions in probabilistic terms, and indirect, in which experts are asked to provide opinions in 
less technical terms that may be more amenable to their field of expertise – and recommended 
that the choice of styles be dependent upon the experts’ background.  Fischhoff (1989), Murphy 
and Winkler (1984), and O’Hagan et al. (2006) offered strategies for avoiding or mitigating 
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potential biases, including expert training, careful facilitation and feedback provided by the 
researcher, and paying attention to experts’ coherence of beliefs.  Additionally, the introduction 
of computer software used to elicit expert belief that can also quickly recognize incoherent, 
irrational, or contradictory information, mitigating some of the challenges associated with expert 
elicitation (Garthwaite & Dickey, 1992; James, Choy & Mengersen, 2010; Lau & Leong, 1999; 
Morris, Oakley, & Crowe, 2014). 
Many of the aforementioned challenges to calibration stem from the use of heuristics in 
the formation of probability judgements.  Hogarth (1987) and Kadane and Wolfson (1998), 
expanding on the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), provided a list of the common 
heuristics that can introduce unhelpful bias into experts’ opinions:  Availability bias (an easier-
to- recall occurrence may incorrectly be deemed more important or likely), anchoring (experts 
may calculate probability based on an initial value), overconfidence, and hindsight (experts who 
have seen sample data may update their opinion).  Heuristics are a particular threat to the 
assumption that elicited probabilities are those that can be described under the normative theory 
of decision making – the use of heuristics can interfere with the rationality and logic required 
under the normative theories.  Kynn (2008) warned that psychological research concerning the 
bias introduced when experts use heuristics to make probability judgments has not kept up with 
the heightened attention paid to Bayesian methods.  As Kynn wrote, “…we should be equally 
concerned with not only what we ask experts to assess, but how we ask it” (p. 240).   
An equally important challenge to expert elicitation deals with bias on the part of the 
researcher.  Expert elicitations (including the elicitation carried out in Chapter Two) commonly 
take the form of an interview, and references to and discussions of researchers’ subjectivity and 
bias are common in the interviewing literature.  For example, Scheurich (1995) termed the 
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potential influences on a qualitative researcher (socioeconomic background, experience, 
expertise, funding sources, power) as “baggage,” and recommended that interviewers 
thoughtfully consider and disclose these types of baggage.  Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) pointed 
out that these subjective influences can even be found in the actual transcription of interviews, 
thus affecting the subsequent analysis.  
Qualitative Research Lessons for Expert Elicitations 
These issues of bias and calibration underscore the importance of a well-designed 
elicitation in which the expert(s) are carefully chosen and the questions are designed in a way to 
minimize the overuse of heuristics and other potential sources of bias affecting experts’ 
confidence in their judgments.  However, formal and informal review of the studies 
incorporating expert elicitation of subjective probabilities, including those cited in this 
manuscript, reveals little discussion of the psychological theories surrounding probability 
judgments or the potential for bias on the part of the experts or the researchers.  Additional 
research regarding the use of heuristics and mitigation of resulting bias will be necessary as 
elicitations to form Bayesian priors become more common.  As Hogarth (1975) wrote, elicitation 
of subjective probabilities “should be designed both to be compatible with man’s abilities and to 
counteract his deficiencies” (p. 284).  Additionally, knowledge about the basics of interviewing 
techniques is also recommended, as the majority of researchers employing Bayesian 
methodology appear to have little to no experience with qualitative techniques such as the 
responsive interviewing model described by Rubin & Rubin (2012).  In the interest of exposing 
and exploring one’s own baggage, as well as that of the experts, researchers using expert 
elicitation and Bayesian inference might consider adopting the type of discussion and disclosure 
often practiced by more qualitative-leaning peers.   
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Expert Elicitations and Institutional Research 
As first pointed out by Gill and Walker (2005), a review of the literature reveals that 
expert elicitation is much more common within life and engineering sciences than in the social 
sciences.  However, at least in the studies included as examples in this manuscript, the full 
advantages of expert elicitations are not as readily extoled in the sciences.  For example, a few of 
the clinical and engineering studies reviewed reveal minimal information about the elicitation 
process, and even dismiss its value.  Dogan (2012) simply mentioned that elicitation was used 
without providing any other detail, and White et al. (2007) used language painting the expert 
elicitation as a sort of consolation prize to use when other data are unavailable.   
Two of the social sciences studies included here as examples addressed the idea that, due 
to its relative familiarity and experience with qualitative methods, social science research should 
be particularly responsive to the expert elicitation/Bayesian approach (Buckley, 2004; 
Vogelgesang & Scharkow, 2009).  Buckley further pointed out that the adoption of Bayesian 
methodology within the social sciences will only catch on after clear and relevant guidance 
regarding the transformation of expert opinion into quantitative data is provided.  Buckley’s 
sentiment is echoed in Moyé’s (2008) critique of Bayesian clinical research, where he called for 
researchers to “take a strong stand for disciplined research methodology” (p. 477) that rivals the 
well-articulated and accepted frequentist version. 
The social science complexities and nuances of institutional research render the discipline 
an excellent candidate for Bayesian methods and expert elicitation.  While large amounts of 
quantitative data are collected and available, there is also a legacy of qualitative approaches that 
can be leveraged and applied towards expert elicitation.  In addition to an institutional 
researcher’s familiarity with qualitative methods, consider the fact that a large number of experts 
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stand at the ready.  Based on their experiences, educators and administrators are experts within 
their individual classrooms and institutions.  Expert elicitation provides an avenue from which 
the expertise of these individuals can be mined and combined with other types of data to produce 
informed and comprehensive conclusions.  Furthermore, expert elicitation is often used to aid 
decision making or prediction under conditions of uncertainty, such as instances in which there 
are not empirical data available, or the introduction of unfamiliar or new situations or problems.  
Additionally, information provided by experts is a viable alternative source of information when 
resources are limited (Kuhnert et al., 2010).  The ideas of uncertainty and limited resources are 
particularly relevant to institutional research, as the field typically operates within tightly 
managed budget and calendar situations with varying amounts of access to data and among 
unique and changing student populations.   
However, before incorporating expert elicitations into institutional research, researchers 
should carefully select elicitation techniques that are appropriate to the specific research 
questions, experts’ abilities, and the researchers’ own capacity.  The researcher should be 
knowledgeable in the benefits and challenges of qualitative methods and be prepared to evaluate 
and discuss heuristics and bias.  Additionally, researchers should have a confident understanding 
of and justification for quantification of the elicited prior.  As Buckley (2004) pointed out, the 
likelihood that the employment of expert elicitation and Bayesian inference in qualitative or 
mixed-method social science research will become commonplace is directly related to whether or 
not Bayesian scholars can effectively equip researchers to correctly gather, analyze and apply 
expert elicitations.  In summary, through careful selection of prior type and application of formal 
elicitation best practices, institutional researchers can leverage and incorporate expert 
information into data analysis and modeling.   
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Elicitation Conclusions 
Eliciting Bayesian priors serves as an excellent way to explore and better answer 
questions for which empirical data are either unavailable or insufficient.  As Gill (2009) wrote: 
The core of this argument is the idea that if the prior contains more information that 
pertains to the estimation problem, then we are foolish to ignore it simply because it does 
not neatly fit into some familiar statistical process.  (p. 28) 
The anxiety introduced by the subjective nature of elicited priors can have benefits 
outside increased information and explanatory power.  For example, research can only benefit 
from increased discussion and disclosure of underlying theories, assumptions, and subjectivities.  
Additionally, the elicitation of priors allows for greater communication and collaboration 
between researchers and experts, ultimately producing a feedback loop of knowledge 
(Garthwaite et al., 2005).  The complexity and nuance inherent in institutional research, abundant 
experts, and a legacy of effective qualitative research methods highlight the discipline’s 
suitability for expert elicitation and Bayesian methodology.   
Bayesian Networks 
Chapter Two of this manuscript describes a study using a Bayesian approach, in which 
expert judgment is elicited and used to design a model that predicts retention.  The practice of 
modeling processes or systems in order to better understand them is not uncommon.  However, 
when reasoning or trying to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty, such models need to 
account for this uncertainty.  Probabilistic networks offer an approach to producing models that 
incorporate uncertainty through the use of probabilistic inference.  These networks typically 
represent causality, illustrate the strength of relationships between variables using conditional 
probabilities, incorporate the numerical quantification of choices or preferences, and solve for 
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maximum expected utility (Kjӕrulff & Madsen, 2008).  Introductions to probabilistic networks 
typically involve medical diagnosis examples where a physician is tasked with making a medical 
diagnosis given symptoms and other information.  In such cases, a probabilistic network is a 
formal way of representing the diagnosis process and conclusions, using probabilistic inference 
and graphical representations of relationships between and among symptoms, other information, 
and the presence of a medical condition.  The following sections discuss Bayesian networks, a 
specific form of probabilistic networks, including such networks’ development, applications, and 
role in educational and institutional research.  
Very simply, a Bayesian network is a graph that models the probabilistic relationships 
between and among variables.  Kjӕrulff and Madsen (2008, p. 3-9) presented a technical 
definition of Bayesian networks, describing the two main elements:  A directed acyclic graph 
(DAG) forming the structure of the model where variables included in the model are represented 
by nodes (often squares, ovals, etc.), and the relationships of independence and dependence 
between and among the variables, which are represented by directed edges (arrow-ended lines) 
and are quantified by conditional probability distributions.  Together, these two elements form a 
Bayesian network that models a joint probability distribution that is equal to the product of the 
conditional distributions of each node.  Equation 1.3 describes this joint distribution: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎(𝑥𝑥1, … 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛) =  �𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
(1.3) 
Figure 1.1 is an example of a very simple, hypothetical Bayesian network modeling the 
retention of an undergraduate student from one year to the next.  The simplified Bayesian 
network implies that retention is dependent on whether or not the student is engaged in student 
life and whether or not the student’s financial need is met.  In this example, based on the 
relationships indicated by the directed links, “Student Engagement” and “Financial Aid Need 
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Met” are “parent” nodes of the “child node,” “Student Retained.”  The lack of a link between 
“Student Engagement” and “Financial Aid Need Met” implies independence between these two 
variables.  The Conditional Probability Table (CPT) (Table 1.3) summarizes the probability of 
retention given the states, or conditions, of the parent nodes.  For example, the probability that a 
student will be retained if she is engaged and has her financial need met is 90%, compared to a 
35% probability of retention given a lack of engagement and unmet financial need.  Note that the 
parent nodes (Student Engagement and Financial Need Met) are not conditioned on other nodes, 
and thus do not have conditional probabilities – the probabilities associated with these nodes are 
considered the prior probabilities. 
 
Figure 1.1  Simplified BN modeling student retention as dependent on student engagement and 
financial need met.  “Student Engagement” and “Financial Need Met” represent parent nodes.   
The directed links represent the parent nodes’ influence on the child node, “Student Retention.” 
 
Table 1.3 
Conditional Probability Table (CPT) – Simple Retention BN 
Parent nodes Child node (Student Retained) 
Student Engagement Financial Need Met Retained (%) Not Retained (%) 
Engaged Met 90 10 
Engaged Not Met 70 30 
Not Engaged Met 60 40 
Not Engaged Not Met 35 65 
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First defined by Kim and Pearl (1983), Pearl (2000) noted that the descriptor “Bayesian 
networks” was adopted in order to highlight the following defining characteristics: “(1) the 
subjective nature of the input information; (2) the reliance on Bayes’ conditioning as the basis 
for updating information; and (3), the distinction between causal and evidential modes of 
reasoning…” (p. 12).  Note that multiple terms describing probabilistic networks with Bayesian 
applications exist in the literature, including “influence diagrams,” “belief networks,” “relevance 
diagrams,” and “knowledge maps,” but the term “Bayesian network” or “BN” will be used 
throughout this manuscript. 
BNs were developed in response to other rule-based systems that failed to consistently 
represent and perform under conditions of uncertainty (Pearl, 1988).  In short, Bayesian networks 
use probability to describe and incorporate uncertainty in a causal situation.  Causality is a key 
property of BNs, and is addressed and explored in Druzdzel and Simon (1993), Heckerman and 
Shachter (1995), and Pearl and Verma (1991).  Heckerman (1997) noted that as conditional 
dependence can be viewed in terms of causality, the directed links between variables in a BN 
typically imply cause and effect relationship between variables.  In other words, direct influences 
on variables within a BN are represented by a directed edge or arrow between two of the 
variables.  Through the representation of independence of variables in the DAG (unconnected 
nodes), a BN models conditional independence and allows for the “explaining away” (inter-
causal inference) of less likely events using conditional probability.  It is this incorporation of 
conditional probabilities that set BNs apart from other graphical models – using conditional 
probabilities and Bayes’ theorem (Equation 1.1), a BN models the change in probability of one 
event occurring given, or conditioned by, another event occurring (Pearl, 2000).  The graphical 
representation of these conditional independencies in probabilistic terms provides users with a 
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clear representation of the relationships between and among variables within a system or 
network.   
BNs perform probabilistic inference to estimate an outcome on one or more variables 
given the state of other variables.  Such inference is completed using applications of Bayes’ 
theorem (Equation 1.1), where a prior distribution is updated via conditional probabilities 
represented in the model to form a posterior distribution.  Although Cooper (1990) and Dagum 
and Luby (1993) concluded that probabilistic inference within Bayesian networks is an NP-hard 
undertaking, a number of researchers have developed inference algorithms to ease computation.  
Heckerman (1997) provided an overview of techniques for probabilistic inference in BNs, 
highlighting an algorithm endorsed by Howard and Matheson (1984), Olmstead (1983), and 
Shachter (1988), which applies Bayes’ theorem to reversals in the directed links between 
variables, as well as the algorithm developed by Dawid (1992), Jensen, Lauritzen and Olesen 
(1990), and Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988), which employs message passing in a tree 
structure.  With the development of computing power, the ability to complete inference in 
increasingly complex BNs using these and other algorithms has grown (Jensen & Nielsen, 2007).   
Kjærulff and Madsen (2008) highlighted the advantages of Bayesian networks, noting the 
efficiency in which these networks conduct inference and convey causal relationships, the ease in 
which the graphical representations can be understood by numerous audiences, and a firm 
foundation in decision theory.  Speigelhalter, Dawid, Lauritzen and Cowell (1993) cited the 
ability of BNs to simultaneously “…be forgiving of limitations in the data but also exploit the 
accumulated data” (p. 221), and Heckerman (1997) acknowledges the ability of BNs to operate 
with incomplete data.  Additionally, due to the use of Bayesian statistics, a BN can flexibly and 
efficiently incorporate additional information as it is gathered.  Chapter Two of this manuscript 
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will include a Bayesian network used for describing, and ultimately predicting, the likelihood of 
retention given certain demographic, academic and affinity variables.  BNs are not without their 
limitations, however.  Niedermeyer (2008) pointed out that novel events may threaten the 
predictive validity of BNs, and cautioned that, even with computing advances, a network with a 
large number of variables may require unreasonable computing and computational power.  
Pourret, Naim, and Marcot (2008) considered the requirement that BNs be acyclic to be a 
limitation as feedback loops are often found in reality.  Additionally, the reliability and quality of 
prior information included in BNs affects a model’s usefulness, although this can be explored 
through adequate model evaluation (Cowell, Dawid, & Spiegelhalter, 1993; Pitchforth & 
Mengerson, 2013). 
Applications - General 
Charniak (1991) and Henrion, Breese and Horvitz (1991) offered introductory overviews 
of BNs, while Darwiche (2009), Jensen and Nielsen (2007), and Koller and Friedman (2009) 
provided detail and instruction on the fundamental theories and applications of BNs.  Kjærulff 
and Madsen (2008), Korb and Nicholson (2010), and Pourrett, Naim and Marcot (2008) included 
applied instruction and real-world examples.  A number of applications of BNs in specific fields 
can be found throughout the literature.  Spiegelhalter et al. (1993) illustrated the use of BNs in 
medical and other types of diagnosis, and Donald et al. (2012), Gao, Madden, Chambers, and 
Lyons (2005), and Neapolitan (2009) provided illustrations of the use of BNs within 
bioinformatics.  Other fields employing BNs include marketing (Baesens, Viaene, van den Peol, 
Vanthienen, & Dedene, 2002; Cui, Wong, & Lui, 2006; Neapolitan, 2007), space flight (Horvitz 
& Barry, 1995), ecology (Landuyt et al., 2013; Marcot, 2008; Shenton, Hart, & Chan, 2014), and 
risk assessment in various disciplines such as business (Phillipson, Matthijssen, & Attema, 
42 
 
2014), engineering and construction (Leu & Chang, 2013; Zhang, Wu, Skibniewski, Zhong, & 
Lu, 2014), and health (Aussem, de Morais, Rodrigues, & Corbex, 2012).    
Applications - Prediction 
As Chapter Two of this manuscript will focus on the development of a BN used for 
prediction, particular attention is paid to the application of BNs for that purpose.  In their 
discussion of the role of causality in BNs, Heckerman, Geiger, and Chickering (1995) wrote the 
following of authors supporting the development of causal formalisms within Bayesian 
networks: 
They argue that the representation of causal knowledge is important not only for 
assessment, but for prediction as well.  In particular, they argue that causal knowledge – 
unlike knowledge of correlation – allows one to derive beliefs about a domain after 
intervention.  (p. 213) 
The key to using a BN for predictive purposes lies in the interpretation of the links 
between variables – within a causal Bayesian network, the nodes from which arrows descend are 
considered parent nodes and direct, immediate causes of the nodes at which they point.  
Friedman, Linial, Nachman, and Pe’er (2000) explained this idea further by pointing out that the 
directionality and causal interpretation of the links between nodes allows for observation of 
intervention effects – if a parent node is a direct cause of a child node, then a change 
(intervention) in the value of the parent node will effect change in the value of its child node.  
This causal interpretation of a BN also requires acceptance of the Causal Markov Assumption, 
which basically states that a variable is independent of all variables outside of its direct causes 
and effects (Hausman & Woodward, 1999; Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, 2000).  Pearl (2000) 
provided a comprehensive explanation of causal Bayesian networks. 
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Instances of BNs used for prediction are found throughout the literature.  Axelrad, Sticha, 
Brdiczka, and Shen (2013) and Venkatesh, Cherurveettil, and Sivashanmugam (2014) employed 
BNs to predict risks to cybersecurity.  Fenton, Neil, and Marquez (2008) built a BN to predict 
software defects, Stahlschmidt, Tausendteufel and Härdle (2013) used a BN to predict offender 
profiles, and Sun and Shenoy (2007) attempted to predict bankruptcy using BNs.  Predictive BNs 
are also commonly used in the study of biological networks (Friedman, et al., 2000; Jansen et al., 
2003), medicine (Cho, Park, Kim, Lee & Bates, 2013; Sandri, Berchialla, Baldi, Gregori and De 
Blasi, 2014; Jiang, Xue, Brufsky, Khan, & Neapolitan, 2014) and weather forecasting (Cano, 
Sordo & Gutiérrez, 2004). 
Model Development 
A review of the literature concerning best practices in network modeling reveals 
consensus on a number of steps that should take place, including comprehensive description of 
the model’s principal function and assumptions, careful construction of the network’s structure 
and underlying probabilities, assessment of the model’s functionality, and discussion of the 
entire model development process (Chen & Pollino, 2012; Crout et al., 2008; Marcot, Steventon, 
Sutherland, & McCann, 2006). 
Structure and relationships.  Spiegelhalter et al. (1993) listed three stages of 
constructing a Bayesian network:  A qualitative stage in which the author defines the 
relationships among and between variables in terms of conditional independence and develops a 
graphical model that reflects these relationships, a probabilistic stage in which the author 
considers the model’s joint distribution, and a quantitative stage in which the author assigns 
values to the underlying conditional probability tables (CPTs).  Approaches to each stage can be 
manual (theory- and expert-driven) or automatic (data-driven), or even a combination of both.  
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The decision regarding approach to model construction often depends on the field on which the 
model is based (Chen & Pollino, 2012; Uusitalo, 2007) or the availability of data (Pitchforth & 
Mengersen, 2013). 
Manual approaches to the construction of a BN require expertise and advanced 
familiarity with the system being modeled – manual construction of Bayesian networks will 
almost certainly require domain knowledge input from experts or previous research.  Neil, 
Fenton, and Nielsen (2000) described the manual process of designing the structure of a BN as 
“knowledge engineering,” and offered a step-by-step approach to the manual construction of a 
BN structure that encourages developers to first focus on the relationships between smaller 
groups of variables before considering the relationships among variables in the entire network.  
The authors proposed five “natural and reusable patterns in reasoning” (p. 13), termed “idioms,” 
that can be used as guidance in modeling directionality, causality, measurement accuracy, 
induction, and reconciliation of two competing factors or explanations.  See Fenton, Neil, and 
Lagnado (2013) as an example of the use of the idioms in the design of network structure.  In the 
same vein of beginning with the building blocks of networks, Helsper and van der Gaag (2002) 
and Fenz (2012) proposed an approach for manual BN development based on ontology, in which 
the anticipated model’s operational definitions and assumptions are clearly defined, and 
recommended collaboration between the knowledge engineering and domain expert(s) in the 
creation of the ontology.  More basic approaches to determining the BN’s structure involve 
identification of the types of variables within the network (background, problem, mediating, or 
symptom) and recognition of the each variable type’s role in a causal network (Kjӕrulff & 
Madsen, 2008).  Edwards (1999), Blodgett and Anderson (2000), Fenton et al., (2013), Laskey 
45 
 
and Mahoney (2000), and Xu, Liao and Li (2008) provided examples of the diversity of 
approaches to manual construction of a BN. 
In cases where data are available, it is possible to learn a BN structure and parameters 
from such data.  A number of algorithms have been developed to accomplish structure learning, 
most of which are either score-based (BN iterations are scored based on data fit) or constraint-
based (incorporates a priori understandings of independence among variables) (Margaritis, 
2003).  Examples of score-based techniques include Naïve Bayes’ (Duda & Hart, 1973), 
evolutionary programming (Larrañaga, Karshenas, Bielza, & Santana, 2013), and Tree 
Augmented Naïve Bayes’ (TAN) learning (Friedman, Geiger, & Goldszmidt, 1997), while 
constraint-based approaches include the PC and SGS algorithms (Spirtes et al., 2000), the 
inductive causation (IC) algorithm (Pearl, 2000), and Necessary Path Condition (NPC) (Steck & 
Tresp, 1999).  Algorithms such as Maximum likelihood (ML), the Expectation-Maximization 
(EM) algorithm (Lauritzen, 1995), and Active Learning (Tong & Koller, 2002) are used for 
parameter/CPT estimation in BNs.  Kjӕrulff and Madsen (2008) and Neapolitan (2004) 
presented an in-depth discussion of the steps involved in structure and parameter learning from 
data, and Aitkenhead and Aalders (2009) and Cui et al. (2006) provided real-world examples of 
purely data-driven learning of BN structure and parameters. 
Note that structure learning from data has been criticized for resulting in over-fitting of 
data (Clark, 2003), and difficulties in finding and training domain experts for manual 
construction are not uncommon.  A hybrid approach to constructing BNs in which both expert 
guidance and data are incorporated in the determination of structure and parameterization is a 
potential solution.  For example, Heckerman et al. (1995) proposed that an expert-generated BN 
can be subsequently updated and improved upon by observed data.  Other hybrid approaches 
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involve employing expert knowledge in identifying the presence and type of relationships 
between variables and subsequently introducing related constraints in the structure and parameter 
learning process – see de Campos and Castellano (2007), Flores, Nicholson, Bruskill, Korb, and 
Mascaro (2011), and Niculescu, Mitchell, and Rao (2006) as examples of use of a priori expert 
knowledge in combination with data to construct a BN.  Masegosa and Moral (2013) proposed 
incorporating expert knowledge after the structure is learned from data, providing guidance on 
any questionable links identified in the learned structure.  Woodberry, Nicholson, Korb, and 
Pollino (2005) developed a technique for combining elicited expert knowledge and data to 
parameterize a model.  In their discussion of the general development of statistical models, 
Kjӕrulff and Madsen (2008) noted the importance of a shift from developing a model designed 
to replicate the human decision process to developing models to support the human decision 
process.  The recognition of the value of human expertise in model designing addressed by 
Kjӕrulff and Madsen is reflected in the popularity of using a hybrid process to construct a BN. 
Chapter two of this manuscript proposes such a hybrid approach to model development, 
in which expert opinion is combined with statistical data to predict retention.  This proposed 
methodology must be considered within the context of over sixty years of discussion of the 
clinical-statistical controversy, or the argument regarding the inferiority/superiority of 
clinical/statistical prediction.  Meehl’s seminal Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction:  A 
Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence (1954/1996) articulated the distinction 
between statistical/actuarial/formal prediction and clinical/informal/impressionistic prediction, 
where the “clinical” method of prediction involves an expert human judge relying on informal 
decision-making procedures (experience, intuition, etc.) and the “statistical” method of 
prediction involves some formal decision-making rules or formula (statistical regression, 
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actuarial tables, etc.) in order to classify or predict.  Noting that predictions using these two 
methods often differ, Meehl further proposed that statistical prediction is generally at least as or 
more accurate and less costly than clinical prediction, rendering it the preferable method of 
prediction.  A number of authors further explored this clinical vs. statistical issue (Dawes, 1988; 
Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989, 1993; Faust, 1991; Goldberg, 1991; Grove & Meehl, 1996; Holt, 
1986; Kleinmuntz, 1990; Marchese, 1992; Meehl, 1956, 1957, 1967, 1973, 1986; Sarbin, 1986), 
and consistently affirmed the superiority of statistical prediction over clinical prediction.  
Extensive meta-analyses performed by Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, and Nelson (2000) and 
Ægisdóttir et al. (2006), further confirmed this idea.  Both meta-analyses incorporated numerous 
studies that included comparisons of clinical and statistical prediction of some type of human 
behavior or medical/psychological diagnosis, and both found statistical prediction to be superior 
to clinical in most cases.  Such conclusions uphold Meehl’s original thesis and argue that, when 
available and possible, statistical prediction should be favored over clinical prediction – not only 
due to higher likelihood of predictive accuracy, but also because it is generally less costly. 
However, Meehl, Grove, and other authors do not completely discount the value of 
clinical prediction.  For example, in the large meta-analysis by Grove et al. (2000), the authors 
pointed out that clinical prediction was found to be on par with statistical prediction in half of the 
included studies.  The authors attributed inferiority of clinical prediction to commonly cited 
heuristics, bias, and lack of feedback (see Dawes, Faust, and Meehl, 1986; Garb, 1989; Hogarth, 
1987, Kadane and Wlofson, 1998; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), leaving open the possibility 
that attempts to alleviate these causes of error could result in improved, and even superior, 
clinical prediction.  Additional authors have addressed the role of clinical or expert judgment 
within context of its assumed inferiority to statistical prediction.  Meehl (1954/1996) recognized 
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“special powers of the clinician,” (p.24) particularly in noting clinicians’ ability to identify or 
recognize special or unique circumstances that may render statistical predictions inaccurate on a 
case-by-case basis, but not in a more general, widespread basis.  Dana and Thomas (2006) 
further examined the role of clinician in prediction, presenting examples in which more accurate 
prediction results from the incorporation of clinician-identified influential factors into statistical 
predictive models rather than holistic clinician judgment.  The authors suggested that a 
clinician’s expertise and valuable experience and input is best realized through “use of a formal, 
explicit procedure” (p. 425) – in other words, formal, systematic modeling of clinician decision-
making incorporates the best of both worlds in the clinical-statistical controversy.  As Dana and 
Thomas wrote, “Hopefully, the clinical-statistical controversy can move beyond whether we can 
deny or replace the talents of human judges to determining how we can use the special 
knowledge of human judges in a more rigorous manner” (p. 425).  This study in Chapter Two 
proposes to do just that – formally and rigorously include the opinions and unique experience of 
undergraduate student retention experts into a statistical predictive model.   
Model evaluation.  Assessment of a BN’s functionality is critical regardless of whether 
the model was built for description, classification, or prediction.  BNs designed using structure or 
parameter learning are often evaluated using measures of fit.  The Minimum Description-Length 
(MDL) metric, described by Lam and Bacchus (1994) and Rissanen (1978), is commonly 
employed as a measure of fit among learned-structure BNs as it reflects model simplicity against 
model accuracy.  The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is another metric used to evaluate 
model fit that also considers model parsimony (Kass & Wasserman, 1995).  
 It is generally recommended that a final BN reflect parsimony in the number of nodes 
and the size of the CPTs for each node (Chen & Pollino, 2012; Adkison, 2009).  Model 
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parsimony is accomplished when there is a balance between the number of nodes and model 
sensitivity – fewer parent modes simplify the CPTs, but fewer nodes also may result in omitted 
information.  An approach to simplifying models recommended by Olesen et al. (1989) and Neil 
et al. (2000) is “parent divorcing,” in which related parent nodes are combined into one node that 
effectively describes the influence of the individual nodes thus reducing the number of nodes and 
subsequent complexity of the associated CPTs.  Heckerman & Breese (1994) proposed temporal 
transformation as an approach to model simplification in which a temporal element is introduced 
in the analysis and representation of causal relationships, and Kjӕrulff and Madsen (2008) 
recommended a technique involving the creation of a new variable that represents structural and 
functional uncertainty in a model. 
Models built using expert knowledge require different approaches to model validation.  
The experts participating in the elicitation should be asked to provide opinions of the final 
network’s accuracy, and if data are available against which to compare, a BN can be evaluated 
using measures of predictive accuracy, deviations from expected value, and the extent to which 
predictions are calibrated (information reward) (Korb & Nicholson, 2010).  Pollino, Woodberry, 
Nicholson, Korb, and Hart (2006) recommended evaluating BNs through sensitivity analyses, in 
which the magnitude of the effects of changes in a network’s structure or parameters are 
measured.  Pitchforth and Mengersen (2013) proposed that, as a BN’s performance is a function 
of the both its structure and parameters, each of these dimensions should be evaluated for 
validity separately in addition to the performance of the model as a whole.  Pitchforth and 
Mengersen further recommended using psychometric approaches to validity such as those 
described in Zumbo and Chan (2014) in evaluating an expert-elicited BN.   
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As Chapter Two of this manuscript will detail the creation and use of a predictive BN, 
particular attention is paid to the evaluation of a BN’s predictive validity.  Cowell, Dawid, and 
Spiegelhalter (1993) proposed that, in addition to overall fit, the predictive accuracy for 
individual nodes (node fit) and the quality of the modeled relationship between parent and child 
node (edge fit) should be evaluated.  When data are available, comparing predicted values with 
actual values is the most straightforward way to discern a model’s predictive accuracy.  In a BN 
with learned structure, the original data set is typically divided into subsets, where one is used for 
training/calibration and one is used for testing.  In addition to comparing a BN’s predictions with 
observed data and previously collected data, Pollino et al. (2006) called upon experts to review 
and evaluate a proposed BN.  Lalande, Bourguignon, Carlier, and Ducher (2013) evaluated 
prediction accuracy using Receiver Operating Characteristics curves (ROC) that compare 
sensitivity against specificity, while Gutierrez, Plant, and Theiler (2011) used modified 
confusion tables to identify thresholds of acceptable risk of error prediction.  In addition to these 
examples found in the literature, Marcot (2012) provided a review of metrics related to 
predictive accuracy, including error rates and confusion tables, ROC curves, k-Fold cross-
validation, Schwarz’ BIC, the true skill statistic, and Cohen’s kappa.   
It was earlier noted that one of the major benefits of the Bayesian approach, particularly 
when subjective probabilities and judgments are involved, is the increased transparency and 
discussion generated.  This benefit can be extended into the design and evaluation of BNs.  For 
example, Jakeman, Letcher, & Norton (2006) recommended a holistic evaluation of the model 
including thorough discussion of the development of the model, the model’s sensitivity to 
changes in structure, parameters, or assumptions, and whether or not the model is actually useful 
in applied settings.  As these authors wrote, “….model accuracy (the traditional modeller’s [sic] 
51 
 
criterion) is only one of the criteria important in real applications” (p. 612).  In conclusion, by 
evaluating a model’s validity, a researcher is not only ensuring that the model actually describes 
the system of interest but is also perpetuating an ongoing, iterative process of critiquing and 
improving the model. 
Bayesian Networks in Educational and Institutional Research 
Chapter Two of this manuscript will describe the development and use of a BN modeling 
and predicting the first-year to second-year retention of undergraduate students.  As this study 
includes elements of educational research used for an institutional research objective, the 
following section reviews examples of BNs used in educational and institutional research 
throughout the literature.  
In their discussion of the development of a dynamic tutoring system powered by a BN, 
Conati, Gertner, and VanLehn (2002) wrote that BNs offer a “unifying framework to manage the 
uncertainty in student modeling” (p. 372).  BNs can be found in a broad array of educational 
research topics, including psychometrics and item response modeling (Albert, 1992; Desmarais 
& Pu, 2006; Mislevy, Almond, Yan, & Steinberg, 1999), Evidence-Centered Design assessment 
(Almond, Mislevy, Steinberg, Yan, & Williamson, 2015; Shute, Hansen, & Almond, 2008), 
educational psychology (Nussbaum, 2011), and most commonly, in the design and evaluation of 
intelligent tutoring systems (Bunt & Conati, 2003; Ley, Kump & Albert, 2010; VanLehn, 2008).  
Xu and Ishitani (2008) and Heckerman (1997) employed Bayesian networks in exploratory 
modeling of institutional data, and Xu (2012) used Bayesian networks to produce models of 
female faculty professional experiences. 
Of particular interest to institutional researchers is the use of BNs for prediction.  Meyer 
and Xu (2007) developed a BN predicting faculty technology use, and Bekele and Menzel (2005) 
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developed a BN correctly predicting performance in high school math nearly two-thirds of the 
time.  Käser et al. (2013) used a BN predicting students’ math knowledge to inform a 
computerized tutoring system, and Galbraith, Merrill, and Kline (2010) explored the predictive 
relationship between student evaluations and learning outcomes in college business courses.  
Sharabiani, Karim, Sharabiani, Atanasov, & Darabi (2014) predicted the end of course grades for 
students in engineering courses using a BN, and Torabi, Moradi, and Khantaimoori (2012) 
experimented with a variety of algorithms to build a BN that predicted student performance 
given teacher attributes.  Kotsiantis, Pierrakas, and Pintelas (2004) and Kotsiantis, Patriacheas, 
and Xenos (2010) explored the capabilities of BNs in predicting performance in distance 
education courses, ultimately determining that pairing the BN-predicted results with other 
classification approaches yielded the most accurate results.  Lykourentzou, Giannoukos, 
Nikolopoulos, Mpardis, and Loumos (2009) also addressed distance education, using a BN to 
model likelihood of course attrition.   
A number of authors compared the predictive performance of educational- and 
institutional research-related BNs to models developed with other techniques and report mixed 
results:  Bukralia, Deokar, Sarnikar, and Hawkes (2012) used the Naïve Bayes’ classifier to 
develop a BN that predicted attrition in online classes less accurately than other methods like 
artificial neural networks and decision trees.  Yukselturk, Ozekes, and Tűrel (2014) reported 
similar findings when predicting student dropout from an online program.  Osmanbegović and 
Suljić (2012) found that BN outperformed decision trees and neural networks in predicting 
student success in economics courses, while Taruna and Pandey (2014) reported opposite results 
for students in engineering courses.  In their comparison of BNs and decision trees in predicting 
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general academic performance in terms of GPA, Nghe, Janecek, and Haddawy (2007) found 
decision trees to be more accurate predictors.  
Recall that that one of the two main techniques in designing the structure and assigning 
the parameters to a BN involves learning from data.  Machine learning and data-mining are 
currently significant ideas in educational and institutional research:  Peña-Ayala (2014), Romero 
and Ventura (2007), and Suhirman, Zain, and Herawan (2014), provided summaries and reviews 
of recent educational research incorporating data-mining, with Peña-Ayala noting the popularity 
of BNs as frameworks for educational data-mining.  Institutional researchers cited machine-
learned BNs as tools for identifying previously unrecognized predictive variables (Antons & 
Maltz, 2006; Fernandez, Morales, Rodriguez, & Salmerón, 2011; Lykourentzou et al., 2009), and 
Heckerman (1997) presented a case study in which historical data concerning student 
demographics and college choices were used to build a BN depicting the causal influences on 
college plans as a tutorial on the role of data-mining in BNs.   
Examples of purely manual construction of BN are rare in the educational and 
institutional research literature.  In their development of a BN used to model learning 
progressions, West et al. (2010) employed experts’ input in addition to other techniques (latent 
class analysis) into the design of BN’s structure, but the authors do not comment on the 
methodology for specifying the model’s parameters.  Almond, Mislevy, Steinberg, Yan, & 
Williamson (2015) described the process of eliciting BN structure and parameters, while noting 
that models should be updated as data become available.  More often, educational and 
institutional researchers employ a hybrid process involving learning from data as well as expert 
input.  van Duijnhoven (2003) used a hybrid methodology in which expert knowledge and 
machine learning were applied in the development of a BN modeling student knowledge, and 
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subsequently confirmed the expert-elicited structure and parameters against data-generated 
models.  García, Amandi, Schiaffino, and Campo (2007) designed a BN for identifying learning 
styles using theory to manually specify the BN’s structure and a combination of Felder’s (1988) 
learning style definitions and data to assign conditional probabilities.  Similarly, Wang and Beck 
(2013) used a previously developed student skill model to design the structure of a BN, while 
using data to parameterize the model.  
In a discussion of the use of machine learning to develop a model used to predict 
retention, Delen (2010) highlighted how suited machine learning is for institution-specific 
settings – an institution’s issues are unique to its population and environment and mining 
historical data can provide patterns unique to the institution.  However, Delen also pointed out 
that data mining and theory-driven research can be used in tandem to identify important variables 
and any relationships among them.  Although the author did not use a Bayesian approach in 
modeling, this idea – the idea of leaving no data behind – echoes one of the most influential 
arguments for a Bayesian approach.  Extending this idea to the use of BNs in institutional 
research, capitalizing on accepted theory and expert input as well as accessibility to historical 
data seems an ideal approach to developing BNs to address institutional issues.  
In conclusion, the incorporation of BNs into educational and institutional research is an 
approach gaining in popularity and application.  While BNs related to intelligent tutoring 
systems are most popular, they are also found in psychometrics, educational assessment, data 
modeling, and, most relevant to this study, prediction of outcomes.  The literature reveals a 
number of approaches, although models developed through the use of data mining and machine 
learning are most common within institutional research.  BNs offer an excellent approach to 
dealing with the uncertainty inherent in educational research and are particularly suited to the 
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narrower field of institutional research, efficiently handling the type of research questions, data, 
and audiences addressed in higher education.  di Pietro, Mugion, Musella, Renzi, & Vicard 
(2015) advocated for the use BNs in the modeling complexities of higher education, noting that 
BNs represent a “holistic”, global approach to answering common institutional research 
questions.  In addressing the uncertainty inherent in systems of social science, as well as the 
complexity and unique nature of institutions, the compatibility of Bayesian approaches with 
institutional research is clear.  A BN handles the uncertainty in student-related data while also 
offering an intuitive, accessible modeling capability that supports the decision-making and 
policy-setting processes.    
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2 DESIGNING A BAYESIAN NETWORK TO PREDICT LIKELIHOOD OF 
RETENTION OF UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS  
Ensuring that first-year, degree-seeking undergraduate students return for their 
subsequent academic year (“undergraduate first-to second-year retention”) is a high priority issue 
in higher education.  Nationally, 72.9% of all undergraduate students are retained at the same 
institution from their first to second year.  This number is higher for students at private nonprofit 
institutions (80.3%), slightly lower among public institutions (71.4%), and lowest among for-
profit institutions (62.8%)  (U.S. Department of Education, 2014).  In addition to nationwide 
calls to consider retention rates as an accountability measure of student progression and 
institutional success (Carey & Aldeman, 2008; Longden, 2006; Pike & Graunke, 2015), various 
higher education accreditation agencies and rankings organizations consider retention rates in 
assessments of institution quality (Wimshurst, Wortley, Bate, & Allard; 2006).  Students and 
other stakeholders are negatively affected by the increased time to graduation often resulting 
from attrition (Complete College America, 2011), and the costs of recruiting new and 
replacement students are high (Noel-Levitz, 2013).  Retention rates are particularly important 
among tuition-dependent institutions where even small fluctuations in year-over-year retention 
result in large impacts in revenue and budget management (Schuh & Gansemer-Topf, 2012). 
Due to the importance of retention in enrollment planning and financial management, 
developing a clear understanding of the factors that influence students’ decisions to return for a 
second year is critical.  Through identification of structure, relationships, and interactions in the 
retention-related data, it is possible to create a statistical model of current and prior student 
retention that can be used to predict future students’ retention decisions.  In addition to 
enhancing institutional knowledge as the process of development requires clear articulation and 
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exploration of aspects of retention, ideal models are easily used and understood by various 
stakeholders (institution administrators, researchers, academic advisors, admissions counselors) 
and contain the capacity to be updated as student populations change.  Additionally, a model that 
facilitates prediction of retention aids in the identification of students at risk for attrition, informs 
institutional intervention and student advising policy, and enables more precise enrollment 
planning. 
Research Questions 
This study addresses the following research questions: 
1.   Based on expert information and data, what are the greatest influences on first-to 
second-year undergraduate retention at a small, private liberal arts college in the 
southeast?  
2. Using this knowledge from both sources, can a graphical model employing Bayesian 
Networks be built that adequately predicts retention? 
Literature Review 
Undergraduate First- to Second-Year Retention 
The preeminent literature surrounding retention of U.S. college and university students 
suggests that retention is influenced by a combination of pre-college student characteristics and 
students’ social and academic experiences once at an institution (Astin, 1993; Bean, 1980, 1985; 
Cabrera, Nora, & Castaneda, 1993; Pascarella & Terenzini, 1980, 1991; Tinto, 1975, 1988, 
1993).  These authors cited student integration into and commitment to the educational and 
institutional environments, faculty-student interaction, and social engagement as key influences 
on student retention.  Tinto’s integration framework (1975, 1993), suggesting that students’ 
commitment to and likelihood of graduating from an institution grows as they are socially and 
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academically integrated, has been explored and modified by numerous authors over the years and 
formed the foundation for the study of undergraduate retention and graduation (Swail, 2004).  
Astin (1993) focused on the impact of student involvement in college as an influence on 
retention, and Bean (1980) emphasized the important role of pre-college characteristics such as 
high school performance and socioeconomic status.  Cabrera, Nora, and Castaneda (1993) and 
Pascarella and Terenzini (1991, 2005) explored the convergence of proposed retention models 
and theories and began to introduce and investigate different subpopulations of undergraduate 
students and their unique responses to retention predictors.  More recent retention literature 
indicates a shift towards the inclusion of non-cognitive variables such as motivation, self-
efficacy, and academic self-concept into theories of undergraduate retention (Covington, 2000; 
Demetriou & Schmitz-Sciborski, 2011; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). 
Additional studies discuss and evaluate specific predictors of retention, and a review of 
the most recent of these reveal that retention predictors tend to fall within the following broad 
categories:  Pre-college student characteristics, pre-college academic preparation, student 
characteristics in college, and institutional characteristics.  Pre-college student characteristics 
include demographic variables such as race-ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic and first-
generation status, and the literature points to a trend in which students in underrepresented 
minority groups, student with financial challenges, and students who are the first in their family 
to attend college are less likely to retain and graduate (The Education Trust, 2004).  Pre-college 
academic preparation is reflected in students’ high school GPAs, class ranks, and standardized 
achievement test scores, and unsurprisingly, are generally positively correlated with retention 
within the literature (ACT, 2010; Adelman, 1999; Astin & Oseguera, 2005; Lotkowski, Robbins, 
& Noeth, 2004).  A large amount of retention literature addressing specific predictors focuses on 
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student characteristics during college, including financial support, distance from home, social 
support and engagement, socioeconomic status, academic engagement and participation, and 
other non-cognitive attributes.  These factors are well summarized by Pascarella and Terenzini 
(2005), and tend to predict retention in the direction that one would intuitively expect.  For 
example, students with less financial support and further distance from home are less likely to 
retain compared to students with more financial support and attending college closer to home 
(Bista & Foster, 2011; Titus, 2006), and students with superior study skills and psychosocial 
attributes tend to retain at higher rates than those without (Robbins et al., 2004).  Researchers 
have also addressed the role of institutional characteristics such as institutional control, 
selectivity, mission, and size in influencing retention (see Astin & Oseguera, 2012; Pike, 2013; 
Ryan, 2004; Titus, 2004).  The extent to which an institution focuses on retention has also been 
found to have impact (Howard, 2013; Oseguera & Rhee, 2009; Porter & Swing, 2006).  A 
comprehensive listing of commonly named predictors of retention, along with examples found in 
the literature, is presented in Appendix A. 
As this study focuses on retention within a liberal arts setting, particular attention is paid 
to findings of the few authors addressing retention specifically within the liberal arts.  Nesler 
(1999) focused on retention at a liberal arts college that offered courses exclusively through 
distance education to nontraditional students, finding that retention was influenced by a 
combination of student and environmental characteristics.  Howard (2013) explored the influence 
of first-year programming on student retention at rural liberal arts colleges, finding its impact 
negligible.  Employing analysis of students’ social networks, Eckles and Stradley (2011) 
identified the importance of students’ friends on influencing retention at a small liberal arts 
college, building upon Thomas’ (2000) findings of the significance of students’ social integration 
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on retention at liberal arts colleges.  Finally, Gansemer-Topf, Zhang, Beatty, and Paja (2014) 
highlighted college transition success, realistic academic expectations, and social integration as 
important influences on retention at a small, highly selective liberal arts college, while also 
pointing out that unique campus populations can produce unique retention predictor conclusions.  
Given smaller liberal arts institutions’ unique populations and the aforementioned reliance on 
enrollment and net tuition revenue, the need for a clear understanding of the forces of retention 
and the ability to accurately predict the likelihood of retention for individuals or groups of 
students becomes apparent.   
A Bayesian Approach 
This study presents the development of a probabilistic network that models and predicts 
first-to second-year undergraduate retention.  The network employs a Bayesian approach, where, 
through the use of conditional probability rules expressed in Bayes’ theorem (Equation 2.1), 
current knowledge or beliefs about the probability of an event occurring (“prior probability”) are 
updated with new information in order to form a more accurate prediction (“posterior 
probability”).  Bolstad (2007) and Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004) provided 
comprehensive introductions to Bayesian statistics and data analysis, while Gill (2009) offered a 
guide to the approach within the context of social and behavioral sciences.  Gigerenzer (2002) 
illustrated the use of Bayes’ theorem with applied examples.   
 
𝑝𝑝(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴) =  𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵)𝑝𝑝(𝐵𝐵)
𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴)  (2.1) 
The use of the word “beliefs” in describing the probability updating in Bayesian 
methodology is important.  A Bayesian approach to probability is in direct contrast to a 
frequentist approach in that Bayesian statistics interprets probability as a degree of belief rather 
than as the long-term proportion of successful outcomes to number of attempts.  This degree of 
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belief represents prior knowledge pertaining to the likelihood of an event, which is then updated 
with data relevant to this event in order to form a new, or posterior, belief in the probability of 
the same event occurring.  Within the larger field of Bayesian statistics, the use and definition of 
a priori knowledge and beliefs (“priors”) is an ongoing discussion, and the choice and use of 
prior type is often driven by the weight assigned to and source of the prior knowledge.  
Uninformative priors are those that provide little additional information or explanatory power 
(Gill, 2009), and Kass and Wasserman (1996) and Yang and Berger (1997) provided a catalog 
and review of such priors.  Priors that intentionally include knowledge designed to influence 
posterior probabilities are termed “informative,” and can be derived from a number of sources 
such as previous studies and results or researcher expertise (Gelman et al., 2004; Gill, 2009).  
Press (2003) outlined the advantages of informative priors, noting that they capitalize on expert 
knowledge and present an avenue for analysis when other information (“objective” Bayesian 
priors, or even a frequentist approach) is unavailable.   
It is this use of informative priors that prompts the common criticism that Bayesian 
statistics employs subjective probability, and thus contradicts the objectivity valued in the 
modern scientific method.  A number of authors have addressed this criticism by pointing out 
that, regardless of approach, an expectation of pure objectivity is unreasonable.  Researchers’ 
choices regarding research questions, methodologies, and analysis techniques could all be 
considered subjective choices (Berger, 2006; Gill, 2009; Hennig, 2009; Press & Tanur; 2001; 
Stevens & O’Hagan, 2002; Weatherford, 1982).  Additionally, requirements of coherence and 
adherence to the laws of probability limit the use of arbitrary and unrealistic informative priors 
(Bovens & Hartmann, 2003), and, as D’Agostini (2001) describes, the process through which 
subjective Bayesians consider and account for the conditions affecting their degrees of belief and 
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choice of priors leads to a  conclusion that “the coherent subjectivist is far more responsible (and 
more "objective", in the sense that ordinary parlance gives to this word) than those who blindly 
use standard 'objective' methods” (p. 25). 
Bayesian networks.  A goal of this study is the construction of a predictive graphical 
model that employs Bayesian methodology.  A Bayesian network (BN) is a graphical network 
that, using Bayes’ theorem to calculate conditional and joint probabilities, models the 
probabilistic relationship between and among variables.  A BN consists of two main elements:  A 
directed acyclic graph (DAG) forming the structure of the model, and the independent/dependent 
relationships between the variables that are quantified by conditional probability distributions 
(Kjӕrulff & Madsen, 2008).  Each variable included in the network has a finite set of mutually 
exclusive states, and variables with directed edges pointing towards other variables are 
considered “parent” nodes of “children” nodes – variables not sharing a directed edge are 
considered independent of each other.  Conditional probability tables (CPTs) are attached to each 
variable, in which the conditional probabilities of each variable given the state of other variables 
are presented, and the entire set of probability tables expresses the full model’s parameter set 
(Equation 2.2).  BNs are unique from other graphical models in that, through the use of Bayesian 
probabilistic inferences, users are provided with a clear representation of independencies, 
dependencies, and uncertainty.  Pearl (1988) and Lauritzen (1996) offered comprehensive 
introductions to graphical models and BNs, and Pearl and Verma (1991), Druzdzel and Simon 
(1993), and Heckerman (1997) explored the capability of BNs to illustrate conditional 
dependence and causal influence.  There are a number of techniques for probabilistic inference 
within BNs, and different algorithms often used are discussed by Dawid (1992), Jensen, 
Lauritzen, and Olesen (1988), and Heckerman (1997).  With the development of computing 
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power, the ability to complete inference in increasingly complex BNs using algorithms has 
increased (Jensen & Nielsen, 2007). 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎(𝑥𝑥1, … 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛) =  �𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖|�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 
(2.2) 
Kjærulff and Madsen (2008) highlighted the advantages of Bayesian networks, noting the 
efficiency in which these networks conduct inference and convey causal relationships, the ease in 
which the graphical representations can be understood by numerous audiences, and the 
methodology’s firm foundation in decision theory.  Speigelhalter, Dawid, Lauritzen, and Cowell 
(1993) cited the ability of BNs to simultaneously “…be forgiving of limitations in the data but 
also exploit the accumulated data” (p. 221), and Heckerman (1997) acknowledged the ability of 
BNs to operate with incomplete data.  Additionally, due to the use of Bayesian statistics, a BN 
can flexibly and efficiently incorporate additional information as it is gathered.  BNs are not 
without their limitations, however.  Neidermeyer (2008) pointed out that novel events may 
threaten the predictive validity of BNs, and cautioned that, even with computing advances, a 
network with a large number of variables may require unreasonable computing and 
computational power.  Pourret, Naim, and Marcot (2008) considered the requirement that BNs be 
acyclic to be a limitation as feedback loops are often found in reality.  Additionally, poor 
reliability and quality of prior information included in BNs negatively affects a model’s 
usefulness, although this can be mitigated through adequate model evaluation (Cowell, Dawid, & 
Spiegelhalter, 1993; Pitchforth & Mengerson, 2013). 
Bayesian networks are often developed and used for prediction because BNs can be 
considered predictive due to the interpretation of the links between variables as causal.  For 
example, if a parent node is a direct cause of a child node, then a change (intervention) in the 
value of the parent node will change the value of the child mode – the effect can be predicted 
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based on the intervention.  Pearl (2000) and Friedman, Linial, Nachman, and Pe’er (2000) 
provided explanations of causal BNs, and Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (2000) provided a 
background of the Causal Markov Assumption, upon which a causal/predictive interpretation of 
BNs is predicated.  In this study, a BN is used to predict the likelihood of first-to second-year 
undergraduate retention given certain conditions of other variables.   
Bayesian network development.  Spiegelhalter et al. (1993) named three stages of 
constructing a Bayesian network: A qualitative stage in which the author defines the 
relationships among and between variables in terms of conditional independence and develops a 
graphical model that reflects these relationships, a probabilistic stage in which the author 
considers the model’s joint distribution, and a quantitative stage in which the author assigns 
values to the underlying CPTs.  Approaches to each stage can be manual (theory- and expert-
driven) or automatic (data-driven), or even a combination of both.  The decision regarding 
approach to model construction often depends on the field on which the model is based (Chen & 
Pollino, 2012; Uusitalo, 2007) or the availability of data (Pitchforth & Mengersen, 2013).   
Manual construction of a model involves input from experts or previous research.  
Approaches to manually determining the structure and relationships of a BN range from complex 
use of idioms and ontology (Fenton, Neil, & Lagnado, 2013; Fenz, 2012) to more simple 
methods involving identification of each variable and their causal influences/influencers 
(Kjӕrulff & Madsen, 2008).  Commonly cited authors such as Garthwaite, Kadane, and O’Hagan 
(2005), Gill (2009), Kadane and Wolfson (1998), and O’Hagan et al. (2006) provided a list of 
“best practices” related to elicitation of expert knowledge, and review of these works highlights 
the major stages of a successful elicitation process:  Preparation of the researcher/elicitor, 
selection of expert(s), training of expert(s), confirmed understanding or acceptance of the model 
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for which judgments are being elicited, and the actual elicitation, including assessment and 
feedback.  These practices serve to provide the expert ample opportunity to adequately express 
her beliefs while also allowing the researcher to gather as much helpful information as possible 
and verify her own understanding of what the expert is trying to communicate. 
The structure and parameters of a BN can also be developed automatically, using 
machine learning from data.  Algorithms that enable learning from data are either score-based, 
where successive iterations are scored based on data fit, or constraint-based, where a priori 
understandings of independence among variables are incorporated (Margaritis, 2003).  Although 
there are a number of approaches involving these two types of algorithms, many of which are 
described in Neapolitan (2004) and Kjӕrulff and Madsen (2008), this study employs Tree 
Augmented Naïve Bayes’ (TAN) learning as described by Friedman, Geiger, and Goldszmidt 
(1997) as part of the model development process.   
Both aforementioned approaches to model development face challenges.  Within the 
manual approach, experts’ potential use of heuristics in the formation of probability judgements 
(see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) threatens the reliability and accuracy of information elicited.  
Learning BNs from data has been criticized for over-fitting (Clark, 2003).  In response to these 
difficulties, a hybrid manual/data-driven approach developed.  Heckerman, Geiger, and 
Chickering (1995) first proposed that an expert-generated BN can be subsequently updated and 
improved upon by observed data, and numerous authors paired expert knowledge with machine 
learning to build BNs (de Campos & Castellano, 2007; Flores, Nicholson, Bruskill, Korb, & 
Mascaro, 2011; Masegosa & Moral, 2013; Niculescu, Mitchell, & Rao, 2006; Woodberry, 
Nicholson, Korb, & Pollino, 2005).   
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This study engages a hybrid approach to model development, in which formal elicitation 
of expert opinion is combined with statistical data to predict retention.  Note that this hybrid 
approach to building a predictive model is applicable in larger discussions of clinical and 
statistical prediction, where the “clinical” method of prediction involves an expert human judge 
relying on informal decision-making procedures while the “statistical” method of prediction 
involves some formal decision-making rules or formula (actuarial tables, for example) in order to 
classify or predict.  First discussed by Meehl (1954/1996), the superiority of statistical prediction 
over clinical prediction within the realms of social sciences, human behavior, and medicine is 
confirmed by numerous other studies, particularly within terms of accuracy and cost (Ægisdóttir 
et al., 2006; Dawes, 1988; Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989, 1993; Grove & Meehl, 1996; Grove, 
Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000; Meehl, 1956, 1957, 1967, 1973, 1986).  However, these 
authors did not suggest that clinical, or expert, prediction should simply be ignored.  Instead, 
many authors attributed the overall inferiority of clinical prediction to common heuristics, 
leaving open the possibility that carefully conducted elicitations designed to minimize bias and 
error could improve clinical prediction.  Dana and Thomas (2006), explored situations in which 
clinicians’ predictions could improve model accuracy, noting that the “use of a formal, explicit 
procedure” (p. 425) is critical in best eliciting and incorporating clinicians’ expertise and 
valuable experience into models.  This study proposes to formally and rigorously include the 
opinions and unique experience of undergraduate student retention experts into a statistically-
designed predictive model. 
Implications for Current Study 
This study focuses on the hybrid development of a predictive Bayesian network that will 
be used to model and predict the likelihood of first-to second-year undergraduate retention.  
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Retention is a topic within the larger realm of institutional research, and a review of the literature 
reveals that the use of BNs for prediction in institutional research is not rare.  See the following 
as examples of such research:  Bekele & Menzel (2005), Galbraith, Merrill, and Kline (2010), 
Käser et al. (2013), Kotsiantis, Patriacheas, and Xenos (2010), Meyer and Xu (2007), Sharabiani, 
Karim, Sharabiani, Atanasov, and Darabi (2014), and Torabi, Moradi, and Khantaimoori (2012).  
However, none of these authors employed a hybrid expert/data approach to model construction, 
or, when applicable to the research design, provided details concerning the elicitation of expert 
knowledge.  The choice of using a BN to model and predict retention is based on a number of 
factors – the intuitive nature of a graphical model is appropriate for a range of audiences, the 
ease in which the model updates when presented with new cases and information, and the ability 
to incorporate both expert and data-learned information into the model.  This hybrid design 
method incorporates the work of other scholars, unobserved patterns and trends in historical data, 
and the specific and unique experience and knowledge of campus experts.  Such an approach 
follows the very “Bayesian” idea of leaving no relevant information behind. 
Methodology 
Data/Population 
This study involves the construction of a Bayesian network (BN) that models and 
predicts the likelihood of a first-year undergraduate student returning for her second academic 
year at a small, private women’s college in the southeast with an annual undergraduate degree-
seeking enrollment of approximately 830 students.  First-to second-year retention rates from 
2009 to 2014 averaged 83%, meaning that, on average, 17% of first-year students have not 
returned for their second year.  Retention rates are calculated using cohorts of students.  For 
example, a student entering as part of the fall 2014 cohort of first-year students is considered 
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retained if she is still enrolled as of an enrollment census date in early fall 2015, and an overall 
retention rate represents the percentage of cohort students still enrolled in the following fall 
semester.  Student-related quantitative data (admissions, demographic, financial, and academic 
information) used in the model development process was sourced from institutional databases 
and includes information on 1,438 degree-seeking first-time students entering the institution 
from fall 2009 until fall 2014.   
Model Development 
Development of the BN retention model took place in four major stages:  
1. The construction and comparison of two initial BNs, one learned solely by existing 
data and incorporating variables identified in the literature (“straw man” model), and 
one designed through the elicitation of expert opinions regarding model structure and 
important variables to include (“expert-elicited structural” model). 
2. The construction of an interim BN incorporating the structural insights provided by 
the experts and machine-learned parameters for variables on which data were 
available (“interim” model). 
3. The presentation of this interim model to retention experts for review and formal 
elicitation of prior probabilities on model variables for which no data were available 
or learned parameters were suspect. 
4. The development of a final BN (“final” model), reflecting a hybrid method of 
construction where the BN’s structure and parameters were determined through a 
combination of expert information and machine learning. 
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Each iteration of models were evaluated on a number of measures, including predictive 
validity, internal validity, model complexity, and analysis of sensitivity.  The following sections 
describe these major stages of model development in detail. 
Initial data-learned model.  Using scholarly literature, the researcher identified 
variables commonly understood to influence retention.  These variables are discussed in detail in 
the included literature review and are also presented in Appendix A.  In addition to compiling 
quantitative information for the identified variables on which the institution has collected and 
stored data, the researcher noted literature-identified variables not currently available in 
institutional databases for future presentation to experts for insight and opinion.  
Incorporating the literature-identified variables and compiled data from the 2009 through 
2011 cohorts (data from more recent cohorts were reserved for later model iterations), the 
researcher used Netica 5.2 to develop a “straw man” BN.  The BN’s structure was learned 
through Netica’s Tree Augmented Naïve Bayes (TAN) structure learning, a maximum posterior 
probability score-based technique that examines correlations and includes more relaxed 
independence assumptions over Naïve Bayes (Friedman, Geiger, & Goldszmidt, 1997), and 
parameters were learned using an expectation–maximization (EM) algorithm.  It was understood 
that the resulting model was only to be used as a guide or “first-pass” at developing a retention 
model, as the researcher recognized a lack of non-cognitive data and institution-specific insight 
that would ultimately be incorporated through the elicitation of expert information.  The “straw 
man” BN is presented in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1.  Initial data- and structure-learned “Straw-Man” BN.   
Network interpretation and use.  Without imposing a new student retention scenario and 
its related properties on the “straw-man” BN, each of the network’s nodes show the current-state 
percentage distribution of all prior cases on each variable.  For example, all other conditions held 
constant, the BN demonstrates 81.7% of first-year students from 2009-2011 are retained to their 
second year.  Just over one-half (52.2%) of students included in the model are eligible to receive 
Pell grants, less than one-fifth (17.6%) are first-generation students, and 43.6% of students are 
more than three hours from their home.  Netica automatically discretizes continuous variables 
using existing distributions found in the data – nodes depicting measures of students’ academic 
preparedness (HS GPA, HS Rank, SAT and ACT scores) were thus discretized into three 
approximately equal bins.  Note that all variable classes/categories will ultimately be reviewed 
and potentially modified by experts.   
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In addition to demonstrating the current state of retention and each of the variables 
thought to influence retention, the machine-learned structure of the model reveals that a number 
of the variables are related to each other in some way through the placement of directed edges 
(arrows) between different variables.  For instance “Citz URM,” a node describing whether or 
not a student is an under-represented minority (“URM”), not an under-represented minority 
(“NON-URM”), or international student (“INT”), appears to have a relationship with a student’s 
SAT Math score (“SATM”) and Pell-eligibility (“Pell”).  Unsurprisingly, a student’s high school 
GPA is related to her high school rank percentile (“HS Rank”), and ACT Composite scores 
(“ACTCO”) are related to SAT scores (“SATM,” “SATV,” and “SATW”).  More surprisingly, 
ACT Composite scores also appear to have a relationship with a student’s distance from home 
(“Hours from Home”), perhaps due to geographic ACT/SAT preferences.  The relationships 
presented in the “straw man” model were ultimately explored in further model iterations, using 
insights provided by experts.   
The predictive application of this type of model is demonstrated through the addition of 
findings, or “cases.”  In other words, updating the predictor nodes with the properties of a 
specific retention case will allow a user to view an updated likelihood of retention.  When 
interpreting the results of the model, it is important to consider that adding a finding on one node 
tells the network that a new case has been added where information is only known on that one 
variable – the network will estimate the case’s standings on all other variables based on existing 
data.  For example, if interested in the change in likelihood of enrollment based on first-
generation status, an update of the “First Generation” node to reflect a student is indeed first-
generation decreases the likelihood of retention from 81.7% to 78.7%, given that all other 
retention-related variables are held steady.  If a case’s status on other variables are known, then 
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these can be entered as well and predicted retention will be updated accordingly using Bayesian 
inference.  This quick updating and dynamic presentation is one of the prime advantages to 
Netica’s BN software.  Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the difference in predicted retention of two 
different cases where each case’s status on one or more of the retention-related variables are 
known.  
 
Figure 2.2.  “Straw Man” BN Scenario 1.  A student is known to be First Generation (coded as 
“1”).  Note that probability of retention decreased from 81.7% to 78.7%. 
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Figure 2.3.  “Straw Man” BN Scenario 2.  A student is known to be Pell-ineligible (coded “0”), 
is more than 3.4 hours from home, was ranked within the top 10% of their high school class, and 
scored at least a 620 on the SAT English component.  Note that probability of retention increased 
from 81.7% to 89.5%. 
 
Model evaluation.  As part of the structure and parameter learning process, the data used 
in the initial “straw man” BN were split into subsets for cross-validation.  Cross-validation is 
often used to evaluate the predictive accuracy of models, and is built upon the premise of 
partitioning data so that a model can be learned from one data set (the training set) and the 
resulting derived model’s predictive accuracy be evaluated against the remaining data (the 
testing set) (Geisser, 1975; Stone, 1974).  Many approaches to cross-validation appear in the 
literature, with general advice that the method chosen best represent the research goals and data 
characteristics while minimizing the trade-off between complexity and performance (Hastie, 
Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2009; Morrison, Bryant, Terejanu, & Miki, 2013).  Given this study’s 
context and objectives, the researcher employed the guidance of other studies incorporating 
machine-learning and Bayesian networks (see Alqallaf & Gustafson, 2001; Fienen & Plant, 
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2014; May, Maier, & Dandy, 2010 as examples) and used k-fold cross-validation for this model 
and all future models.  K-fold cross-validation involves randomly splitting cases into k equally-
sized partitions, cross-validating each partitioned sample across the remaining partitions, and 
then averaging predictive performance across all partitions.  A main advantage of k-fold cross 
validation is that it allows for the use of as much training data as possible while protecting 
against model overfit and providing measurements of predictive performance.  Additionally, 
when k is greater than two but also not too large, k-fold cross-validation at least partially 
addresses the “bias/variance” dilemma described by Geman, Bienestock, and Doursat (1992), in 
which minimization of potential bias and prediction error created by an inappropriate data split 
competes with the minimization of variance that is created by using a number of training sets to 
estimate a model’s parameters.  Citing Breiman and Spector (1992) and Kohavi (1995), Hastie et 
al. (2009) recommended five- to ten-fold cross-validation as a bias/variance dilemma 
“compromise” (p. 243), and due to a somewhat limited amount of cases (n=729 in cohorts 2009-
2011 and n=709 in cohorts 2012-2014), this study employs five-fold cross-validation in the 
“straw man” BN and all future BNs.   
Methods for averaging confusion matrices resulting from each fold as described by 
Marcot (2012) and Boyce, Vernier, Nielsen, & Schmiegelow (2002) were used to estimate 
overall model predictive performance using a Confusion Matrix as presented in Table 2.1.  In 
terms of accuracy, the “straw man” model predicted likelihood of retention correctly in 79.7% 
(570/715) of cases.  In terms of misclassification, the model incorrectly predicted retention one-
fifth (20.3%) of the time. 
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Table 2.1 
Confusion Matrix and Error Rate – “Straw Man” BN 
                      Predicted 
Retained 
 
Not Retained 
 
Actual 
566 19 Retained 
126 4 Not Retained 
 
A Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (ROC) is another way to gather information 
about the predictive capability of the “straw man” BN.  Figure 2.4 presents a ROC curve related 
to the “straw man” BN, where the model’s percent of true positive predictions (a measure of 
sensitivity) is plotted against the percent of false positive predictions (a measure of specificity) at 
different threshold values.  The area between the BN curve and the straight dashed line (a ROC 
curve representing a completely uninformative model) represents the difference in an 
uninformative model and the more predictive “straw man” BN at different thresholds.  From 
shape alone, it is clear that the “straw man” BN is more predictively accurate at lower thresholds.  
Further, the area under the “straw man” BN ROC curve (AUC) is calculated to be .55089, a 
value that is considered a poor measure of model prediction performance (Hand, 1997).   
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 Figure 2.4.  “Straw Man” BN ROC Curve.  This figure illustrates the model’s predictive 
accuracy at different thresholds (solid line), as compared to an uninformative model (dashed 
line), as well as the AUC. 
 
The 20% error rate and the small AUC hint at the fact that there is a large amount of 
uncertainty due to influences unaccounted for in the network.  The sensitivity analysis presented 
in Table 2.2 supports this suggestion, in that it demonstrates the degree to which variation in 
retention likelihood is explained by the other included variables (Marcot, Steventon, Sutherland, 
& McCann, 2006).  The Mutual Info column demonstrates the expected decrease in uncertainty 
(as expressed by entropy) in retention likelihood given a state of another variable included in the 
model.  The most influential variable on likelihood of retention is a student’s SAT Reading 
score, but even knowing this score will only decrease uncertainty by 3%.    
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Table 2.2 
Sensitivity Analysis of "Retained" to Other Variables Included in “Straw Man” BN 
Variable Mutual Info Percent Variance of Beliefs 
SATV .0206 2.99 .0046 
SATW .0179 2.59 .0037 
SATM .0158 2.27 .0033 
Citz URM .0116 1.68 .0025 
HS Rank .0093 1.36 .0018 
ACTCO .0068 .99 .0015 
HS GPA .0038 .56 .0008 
Hours from Home .0028 .40 .0006 
First Generation .0011 .15 .0002 
Pell .0003 .04 .0001 
 
In addition to evaluating a model’s predictive performance and sensitivity, a final 
evaluative measure involves considering model complexity.  Complexity can be measured by the 
number of variables, links, and node states, and is typically used for comparing different models 
(Marcot, 2012).  However, it is also helpful to consider model complexity as part of a holistic 
evaluation of single models in an effort to examine variable connectivity and dependence.  
Additionally, complexity is not a necessary condition for reliability or additional insight, so 
parsimony should receive priority (Jakeman & Hornberger, 1993).  The “straw man” BN’s 
complexity measures are summarized in Table 2.3, and indicate a not particularly complex 
model. 
Table 2.3 
“Straw Man” BN Model Complexity Metrics 
Metric Count 
Nodes 11 
Links 19 
Node States 30 
 
In summary, although the “straw man” BN can be described as parsimonious based on 
measures of complexity, evaluating the “straw man” BN in terms of predictive performance and 
sensitivity reveals a weak model.  This was not entirely unexpected for a number of reasons:  1) 
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due to a lack of available non-cognitive quantitative data available, the model incorporated very 
few of the variables often cited in literature, 2) the model was allowed to be machine-learned 
with essentially no supervision (e.g. automatic discretization of continuous variable node states), 
and, 3) the model excludes institution-specific or contextual variables and constraints 
recommended by retention experts.  However, the machine-learned “straw-man” model does 
provide a starting place for comparison and insight for future model iterations. 
Structure elicitation.  An important aspect of this research is the combination of 
machine-learning and expert opinion in order to build a BN that accurately and efficiently 
predicts retention.  The first step in incorporating expert opinion was to query retention experts 
regarding their beliefs about the structure of a graphical network that predicts retention, which 
was then compared to the machine-learned structure of the “straw man” BN in the creation of an 
interim model.  The following section outlines this process of structure elicitation from the 
experts, and incorporates the recommendations of Fenz (2012) to emphasize consistent operating 
definitions and O’Hagan et al. (2006) in the design of the structure elicitation protocol.   
Experts.  The experts participating in the session have a combined twenty-five years of 
experience at the institution working directly with students.  Expert A is an Assistant Dean of the 
College and Director of Academic Advising who has been with the institution for fifteen years, 
and Expert B is an Associate Director of Academic Advising who has been at the institution for 
ten years.  Both individuals have extensive personal experience with the reasons first-year 
students leave the institution, as well as domain knowledge regarding industry-wide retention 
issues.   
Variable elicitation.  As a first step in elicitation of the expert-elicited structural BN, the 
researcher presented the experts with a list of variables identified in the literature as related to 
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undergraduate retention.  The experts were also provided with proposed operating definitions 
and variable classes.  An example of what the experts were asked to review is provided in 
Appendix B.  After providing insight on the inclusion or exclusion of certain variables based on 
relevance to the institution, the experts offered revisions to operating definitions and the 
groupings (variable classes) of states of variables.  The experts also proposed new variables that, 
in the experts’ experience through working with and counseling students at risk of attrition, are 
important predictors of retention that were not identified in the literature.   
Table 2.4 summarizes the list of variables agreed upon by the experts.  In their discussion 
of race/ethnicity or first-generation status as predictors of retention, the experts noted that while 
there is nothing about race/ethnicity or fist-generation status alone that influences retention 
alone, it is highly related to stereotype threat.  For example, the experts agreed that women of 
color are more likely to succumb to stereotype threat, and are therefore less likely to seek and 
access academic support and tutoring.  This idea is also supported in the literature – see Steele 
(1997) and Aronson & Steele (2005) as examples.  The experts also proposed two variables 
related to academic support as influences of retention, while emphasizing that institutional 
emphasis on academic support (as measured by spending or resource allocation to academic 
support programming) is separate and distinct from whether or not a student actually accessed 
such academic support programming.  Institutional emphasis on increasing retention was also 
noted as an influence on retention, and the experts identified a shift in institutional focus on 
retention occurring in the year 2011 as evidenced by the hiring of personnel charged with 
addressing retention issues.  Experts noted that students’ study skills (time management, 
academic discipline, etc.) and course attendance patterns, while potentially related to each other, 
should also be included as exclusive variables in the retention model.  See Allen, Robbins, 
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Casillas, and Oh (2008), Kennett and Reed (2009), and Seo (2012) for discussions of these 
variables and their influence on retention in the literature.  Note that the experts first 
recommended that the study skills and attendance variables should be used in place of other 
commonly employed academic preparedness variables (standardized test scores, high school 
academic records), opining that the institution’s students are typically prepared intellectually and 
academically, but may lack the confidence or study skills necessary for academic success.  After 
extensive discussion, the experts agreed that a composite variable representing academic 
preparation should be employed – the “Academic Rank” variable in Table 2.4 is such a 
composite variable and incorporates high school quality, high school academic record, and 
standardized test scores.  In terms of social support and its influence on retention, the experts 
cited Eckles’ and Stradley’s (2011) analysis of social networks on student retention and affirmed 
the relevance of the study’s conclusions that the negative feelings of one student act as a 
contagion towards others while students’ positive feelings can act as an inoculation against 
negativity, albeit in a weaker capacity.  The experts discussed the need for including variables 
addressing students’ financial need, noting that financial issues and a lack of financial aid 
literacy are more likely to influence retention when other factors, such as academic struggle, are 
present as well.  Additionally, the experts argued that Pell-eligibility, a commonly cited influence 
on retention, is not an appropriate proxy for students with financial issues at the institution as 
one-half of the institution’s students typically receive Pell.  Anticipating that students who may 
struggle academically and have high levels of unmet financial need have very little “wiggle 
room” for financial or academic shortfalls, the experts concluded a financial variable should be 
included that addresses students with high unmet need, while also encompassing academic risk, 
an overall need profile, and evidence of financial aid literacy.  In a finding contradictory to much 
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of the literature, the experts expressed an opinion that students with homes closer to the 
institution (particularly within the institution’s metro area) are less likely to retain.  Additionally, 
noting a commonly expressed reason for leaving during student exit interviews, the experts also 
recommended a variable capturing mismatch between a student’s first-year academic advisor and 
the student’s expressed program of study interest.   
Table 2.4  
List of Variables Proposed and Approved by Experts in Structure Elicitation (Elicitation 
Session I) 
Variable Operating 
Definition 
Variable Classes Weight 
1=Highest 
10=Lowest 
Quantitative Data 
Availability/Measure 
Study Skills Whether or not a 
student 
demonstrates 
good study skills 
– successful time 
management, 
minimal 
procrastination, 
adequate note-
taking and 
review, course 
engagement, etc. 
Developed 
UnderDeveloped 
1 Data proxy:  Hours 
reported spent 
studying on 
institutional survey 
(2011 and later 
cohorts only) 
Financial Need 
& Risk Profile 
Encompasses 
students’ 
academic 
preparedness, 
high financial 
need, unmet 
need, and 
understanding of 
financial aid 
literacy.   
High (High 
Need/High Risk 
Profile) 
Low (Low 
Need/Low Risk 
Profile) 
 
2 Data available.   
Social Support The extent to 
which a student 
is exposed to 
negative or 
positive attitudes 
towards retention 
within their 
social network.   
Positive social 
support 
Negative social 
support 
3 Data proxy:  First-
year housing 
placement within a 
dorm floor with 
unusually high first- 
to second-year 
attrition. 
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Academic 
Support – 
Student Access 
Whether or not a 
student accessed 
academic 
support 
programming.   
Accessed 
Not Accessed 
4 Data Not Available. 
Academic 
Support – 
Institutional 
Whether or not 
an institution 
provides more 
than a nominal 
amount of 
academic 
support 
programming. 
Very Present 
Less Present 
5 Data Proxy:  Receipt 
of grant funding 
development of 
academic resource 
center in 2011. 
Attendance 
Patterns 
Whether or not a 
student 
consistently 
attends 
scheduled course 
meetings. 
Consistent - 
attends > 80% of 
course meetings 
Inconsistent - 
attends < 80% of 
course meetings 
6 Data not available. 
Academic Rank Composite index 
value to 
represent 
student’s 
academic 
preparedness.  
Incorporates 
high school 
quality, 
curriculum 
quality, high 
school academic 
record (GPA and 
rank) and 
standardized test 
scores. 
Lowest 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Highest 
7 Data available. 
Race/Ethnicity Self-reported, 
federally-defined 
race/ethnicity 
categories.   
Underrepresented 
minority 
International  
Other 
8 Data available. 
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Institutional 
Focus on 
Retention 
Institution-wide 
implementation 
of programs, 
services, and 
resources 
designed to 
address 
retention. 
Very Present  
Less Present 
9 Data proxy:  “Less 
Present” if student 
enrolled before 2011.  
“Very Present” if 
student enrolled in 
2011 or after.   
Distance from 
Home 
Distance, in 
hours, of 
institution from 
student’s 
permanent home 
address 
Within one hour 
More than one 
hour 
10 Data available. 
Advisor/Major 
Mismatch 
Assignment of 
academic advisor 
belonging to an 
academic 
department 
outside the 
student’s 
expressed 
program of 
student interest.   
Advisor/Major 
match 
Advisor/Major 
mismatch 
11 Data available. 
 
Structure elicitation.  In preparation for drafting a basic structural model of a retention 
BN, experts were next asked to discuss the relationships between and among the chosen list of 
variables.  Experts were first asked to weight each of the variables in terms of influence on 
retention, beginning with strongest and weakest and moving inward from there (see Kjærulff & 
Madsen, 2008).  These ranks are included in Table 2.4, and were elicited in an effort to introduce 
the idea of causal influence to the experts and ultimately be incorporated in the specification of 
model parameters and CPTs in development of a final model (Netica allows for the inclusion of 
uncertainty using a special case file format).  Using the weightings as reference, the researcher 
prompted the experts to discuss which variables could be considered direct causes of retention, 
and which variables actually influence other variables and should be considered indirect causes 
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of retention.  The discussions of causal influence were included to provide insight as to the 
model’s appropriate structure and variables’ relationships to each other.  The researcher also 
facilitated discussion of conditional independence, asking experts to consider if a student’s state 
on one variable reveals a large amount of information on how this same student might appear in 
another variable.  Examination of variable dependencies were included in order to aid the 
researcher and experts in identifying redundant variables, assure conditional independence 
among included variables, and ultimately contribute to model parsimony.  As the representation 
of uncertainty is a unique feature of BNs, experts were continuously encouraged to express their 
uncertainty in any of these discussions.  Any instances of high uncertainty were ultimately 
included in the specification and evaluation of the final model.   
The literature consistently includes training experts as a best practice in expert elicitation, 
and in order to provide context and demonstrate the basic components and function of a 
predictive BN, the researcher presented the experts with a BN that predicts the likelihood of 
coronary artery disease based on a number of symptoms (Figure 2.5).  The training BN was used 
to provide examples of parent/child nodes, leaf nodes, and conditional independence.  Experts 
were encouraged to consider the variables influencing retention similarly to the symptoms or 
conditions modeled to influence risk of coronary artery disease, and to note the direct and 
indirect relationships between symptoms and disease.  Additionally, the researcher demonstrated 
the dynamic updating capability of a Netica BN, providing an example of the utility and ease in 
which a BN can be used to predict retention given certain conditions or new cases.   
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 Figure 2.5.  Training BN:  Coronary Artery Disease Risk Estimator, Norsys Software Corp. 
Bayes Net Library, http://www.norsys.com/netlibrary/index.htm .  Copyright 2004 by 
Assessment Technologies, Inc.   
 
Finally, the experts were asked to draft a basic structural model of retention incorporating 
the variables and the relationships between and among the variables and retention.  The 
researcher reminded the experts of earlier discussions and decisions regarding causal influence, 
conditional independence, and weight in the formation of the structure, and allowed the experts 
to collaborate in the design although they ultimately drafted their own versions.  Throughout the 
drafting process, the researcher verbally articulated scenarios depicted in the structure in order to 
ensure that the structure accurately represented the experts’ judgments.  A composite of the 
experts’ structure designs is provided in Figure 2.6.    
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 Figure 2.6.  Expert-elicited structural model. 
In summary, the expert-elicited structural BN includes twelve nodes.  All but one 
(“Race/Ethnicity”) are portrayed as direct influences on retention, although five (“Study Skills,” 
“Race/Ethnicity”, “Distance from Home,” “Institutional Focus on Retention,” and “Financial 
Need & Risk Profile”) are also thought to be influences on other included variables.  Table 2.5 
summarizes the model’s complexity, which is very similar to the “straw man” BN. 
Table 2.5 
Expert Elicited Structural Model Complexity Metrics 
Metric Count 
Nodes 12 
Links 18 
Node States 28 
 
Development of interim model.  Development of an interim model designed to 
incorporate the insights gathered from the original “straw man” data- and structure-learned 
model as well as the expert-elicited model involved the comparison and examination of these 
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models’ structures, variables, and data-learned parameters.  Ultimately, this second model was 
designed as an interim stage in preparation of creation of a final model that includes a hybrid of 
expert-elicited and data-learned parameters and structure. 
Comparison of “straw man” and expert-elicited structural model.  Cursory comparison 
of the data- and structure-learned “straw man” model and the expert-elicited structural model 
revealed few commonalities in included nodes.  For example, the experts dismissed the 
importance of including distinct nodes for generally accepted proxies for academic preparedness 
(high school academic records and standardized test scores) in a model, opining that while the 
institution’s students are academically and intellectually prepared, academic success and 
retention at the institution is much more dependent on students’ study skills.  However, the 
experts did endorse the inclusion of a composite variable that incorporates a number of indicators 
of academic preparedness (“Academic Rank”), noting that, in addition to having a direct 
influence on retention, it is also influenced by study skills.  Examination of the links learned in 
the “straw man” model support the inclusion of the composite “Academic Rank” variable in a 
second model– many of the academic preparedness variables were learned to be related to each 
other in the “straw man” model and the combination of them into one variable creates a more 
parsimonious model.  Expert discussion of demographic variables included in the “straw man” 
model revealed experts’ uncertainty of any direct role played by race/ethnicity on retention while 
highlighting their belief that race/ethnicity is involved in other important causes of retention.  
Hence, this variable was still included in a second model but was not shown to have a direct 
influence on retention.  Additionally, the “straw man” model included a variable depicting 
students’ socioeconomic status as determined by eligibility for Pell grants, and indicated that 
socioeconomic status is closely linked with other demographic variables.  The experts’ opinion 
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that the role of finances is much more complicated than simple socioeconomic status and 
ultimate suggestion of a composite financial risk/need variable addresses the confounding and 
redundant influence of demographics on retention expressed in the “straw man” model.  Finally, 
as evaluation of the “straw man” model revealed a relatively weak predictive model with 
unaccounted for influences, all other variables suggested by the experts were included in the 
interim model under the expectation that the experts’ familiarity with institution-specific factors 
is superior to the literature-identified variables on which quantitative data were available that 
were used to build the “straw man” model. 
Parameterizing interim model.  Using Netica, the researcher prepared a second, interim 
BN that incorporated the structural insights provided by experts and was parameterized by 
available existing data (2009-2011 first-year cohort data).  Two of the variables included did not 
have associated existing data (“Attendance Patterns” and “Academic Support-Student Access”) 
and other variables included numerous missing data.  For example, data indicating whether or 
not a student exhibits study skills (as measured by responses on an institutional questionnaire) 
were only available for students in the 2011 cohort.  In order to address these incomplete data, 
Netica allows parameter learning via an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm where 
maximum a posteriori parameter estimates are computed using maximization of the expected 
log-likelihoods of parameters after a number of iterations (see Dempster, Laird, & Rubin, 1977).  
In other words, the EM algorithm is used to maximize the probability of data given the BN’s 
structure and CPTs.  The resulting model reflected the current state of each of the variables for 
which data were available and showed the two unknown variables (“Attendance Patterns” and 
“Academic Support – Student Access”) as having uniform prior probability distributions, or 
equally likely states.  The model also included the data-learned CPTs for each variable when data 
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were available.  As part of design of a final model, the parameters and associated CPTs were 
ultimately presented to the experts in a second elicitation session for review, critique, and 
elicitation of the unknown parameters.   
Development of final model.  Development of the final model included the following 
stages:  Expert review of the interim model, formal elicitation of unknown parameters, 
parameterization of the final model, and evaluation of final model performance.   
Expert review of interim model.  Expert review of the interim model began with 
evaluation of the included variables’ operating definitions.  Noting that the two institutional 
variables (“Academic Support-Institutional” and “Institutional Focus on Retention”) are 
irrelevant for any post-2011 cohorts as both variables served as indicators of a shift in 
institutional priority to increasing retention beginning in 2011 and continuing forward, the 
experts recommended exclusion of these two variables from any final model.  The experts also 
discussed the quantification of “consistent” and “inconsistent” attendance patterns, confirming 
that attending 80% or more course meetings is appropriately considered “consistent.”  
Additionally, the experts considered the “Academic Support-Student Access” variable, focusing 
on what activities should be considered “academic support programming” and the frequency at 
which student access of such programming would begin to influence retention likelihood.  
The researcher next introduced a comparison of the variable influence rankings 
established by the experts in the first elicitation session against the rankings suggested by 
sensitivity analysis of the data-learned parameters in the second/interim model.  The only major 
difference in the relative importance suggested by the experts and reflected in the data-learned 
parameters of the interim model was the influence of “Academic Rank,” with the data-learned 
parameters suggesting retention was more sensitive to academic preparedness than the experts 
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anticipated.  Discussion of the ranks was included in an effort to gage experts’ uncertainty with 
specific variables that would be incorporated into the final model.  For example, a conflict 
between expert-understood rank and data-learned rank could be addressed and mitigated by 
using Netica’s uncertain case file format in development of the final model.  The final list of 
included variables and their related operating definitions, ranks, variable classes and data sources 
are summarized in Table 2.6.  
Table 2.6  
List of Variables Operationalized and Approved by Experts in Model Review and Parameter 
Elicitation Session (Elicitation Session II) 
Variable Operating 
Definition 
Variable Classes Weight 
1=Highest 
10=Lowest 
Quantitative Data 
Availability/Measure 
Study Skills Whether or not a 
student 
demonstrates 
good study skills 
– successful time 
management, 
minimal 
procrastination, 
adequate note-
taking and 
review, course 
engagement, etc. 
Developed 
UnderDeveloped 
1 Expert estimations. 
Academic 
Rank 
Composite index 
value to 
represent 
student’s 
academic 
preparedness.  
Incorporates 
high school 
quality, 
curriculum 
quality, high 
school academic 
record (GPA and 
rank) and 
standardized test 
scores. 
Lowest 
Low 
Medium 
High 
Highest 
2 Data available. 
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Social Support The extent to 
which a student 
is exposed to 
negative or 
positive attitudes 
towards 
retention within 
their social 
network.   
Positive social 
support 
Negative social 
support 
3 Data proxy:  First-
year housing 
placement within a 
dorm floor with 
unusually high first- 
to second-year 
attrition. 
Financial 
Need & Risk 
Profile 
Encompasses 
students’ 
academic 
preparedness, 
high financial 
need, unmet 
need, and 
understanding of 
financial aid 
literacy.   
High (High 
Need/High Risk 
Profile) 
Low (Low 
Need/Low Risk 
Profile) 
 
4 Data available.   
Academic 
Support  
Whether or not a 
student accessed 
academic 
support 
programming.  
Academic 
support 
programming 
includes student-
initiated 
meetings with 
instructors or 
attendance at 
academic 
resource center 
programming. 
None  
Low – Student 
attended at least 
one and less than 
five self-initiated 
meetings with 
instructor or other 
academic support 
programming.   
High – Student 
attended five or 
more self-initiated 
meeting with 
instructor or 
academic support 
programming. 
5 Expert estimation. 
Attendance 
Patterns 
Whether or not a 
student 
consistently 
attends 
scheduled course 
meetings. 
Consistent - attends 
> 80% of course 
meetings 
Inconsistent - 
attends < 80% of 
course meetings 
6 Expert estimation. 
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Distance from 
Home 
Distance, in 
hours, of 
institution from 
student’s 
permanent home 
address 
Within one hour 
More than one hour 
7 Data available. 
Advisor/Major 
Mismatch 
Assignment of 
academic 
advisor 
belonging to an 
academic 
department 
outside the 
student’s 
expressed 
program of 
student interest.   
Advisor/Major 
match 
Advisor/Major 
mismatch 
8 Data available. 
Race/Ethnicity Self-reported, 
federally-defined 
race/ethnicity 
categories.   
Underrepresented 
minority 
International  
Other 
N/A (no 
direct 
influence 
on 
retention) 
Data available. 
 
Formal elicitation of conditional probabilities.  As noted earlier, two of the variables 
included in the interim model did not have associated available quantitative data (“Attendance 
Patterns” and “Academic Support”) and one variable deemed particularly important by previous 
models and experts (“Study Skills”) contained substantial missing data.  Consequently, the 
parameters associated with these variables (their conditional probabilities) were elicited from the 
two experts using formal and rigorous methodology designed to accurately represent the experts’ 
knowledge and minimize bias.  Elicitation techniques followed the best-practice guidelines 
outlined in Kadane and Wolfson (2008) and O’Hagan et al. (2006), and utilized materials and 
software from an expert elicitation framework (SHELF:  the Sheffield Elicitation Framework 
version 2.0) designed by Oakley and O’Hagan (2010).  Kadane and Wolfson described a 
successful elicitation as one in which the researcher assures the process is “as easy as possible 
133 
 
for subject-matter experts to tell us what they believe, in probabilistic terms, while reducing how 
much they need to know about probability theory to do so” (p. 4), and this idea was used as a 
guiding principle throughout the session with the experts. 
Prior to the session, the experts were provided with pre-elicitation materials describing 
the purpose and objectives of the upcoming elicitation session, as well as a basic probability 
review and summary of common causes of bias.  The pre-elicitation materials also emphasized 
the important role of uncertainty throughout the process.  The session began with expert review 
of the interim model and its included variables and related operating definitions and rankings 
(see earlier discussion), but the majority of the session focused on the elicitation of probabilities.  
In order to set the stage for the session’s discussions and ensure experts’ proper understandings 
of basic probability theory, the researcher first posed a practice elicitation where a known 
probability was elicited (the retention rate for the 2014 cohort) and the experts were asked to 
describe what that known probability meant in terms of how many students stay, how many 
leave, etc.  The expert also posed a known retention scenario involving conditional probability 
(the likelihood of retention given Pell-eligibility) to gauge and prompt discussion of experts’ 
understanding of conditional probabilities.  Based on expert responses and explanations, the 
researcher determined the experts were prepared to provide estimations of conditional 
probabilities for the three variables in question.   
In accordance with the SHELF materials and guidance, experts were first asked to 
estimate the extreme lower and upper bounds of an overall retention rate, and move inward to 
more likely rates from there.  Oakley and O’Hagan (2010) posited that this technique mitigates 
experts’ overconfidence and encourages experts to consider models outside of what they’re most 
familiar.  In addition to these extreme lower and upper bounds of overall retention rates, the 
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experts provided “medium”, “high,” and “low” estimations of an overall retention rate on which 
they would base their judgements throughout the rest of the session.  As with all estimations 
during the session, the researcher consistently provided feedback (“…given Z, you’re suggesting 
that out of X students, Y wouldn’t return the following fall semester…”) and encouraged experts 
to express their level of confidence and uncertainty in their conclusions.  Additionally, the 
researcher remained mindful of incoherence of judgements, and was prepared to ask experts to 
account for any such incoherence.   
For each variable on which elicitation took place, experts were first asked to estimate the 
current state of each variable given no other information.  For example, as no data were available 
regarding how many students attend courses consistently, experts were first asked to estimate the 
percentage of students consistently attending courses.  This information was entered into a pre-
designed spreadsheet containing conditional probability tables and would ultimately be used to 
simulate the underlying data distributions used in development of the final model.  Experts were 
next asked to provide judgements regarding the conditional probabilities for each variable in 
question.  This topic served as the most intensive in the session, as the number of conditional 
probabilities required grew as the relationships between variables grew.  For example, based on 
the interim model, a full CPT for “Attendance Patterns” involves “Study Skills” and “Retention,” 
while a full CPT for “Academic Support” involves “Race/Ethnicity,” “Study Skills,” and 
“Retention.”  Finally, experts were asked to provide predictions of the probability of retention 
given a number of hypothetical variable scenarios, and their responses were later used as a 
measure of the final model’s internal validity.   
Expert discussion during the conditional probability elicitations revealed a number of 
insights related to model.  For example, the experts expressed a large amount of uncertainty 
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regarding the actual amount of students accessing academic support, but were much more 
confident in estimating the role of accessing academic support on retention.  The experts also 
openly expressed difficulty avoiding availability bias, especially in terms of allowing particularly 
memorable student retention scenarios to overpower more typical situations.  Additionally, the 
experts identified certain probabilistic conditions that, while puzzling to an outside viewer, are 
specifically relevant and unique to the institution.  For example, given the experts’ conclusion 
that students’ study skills exact a heavier influence on likelihood of retention than students’ 
attendance patterns, once would expect a pattern of probability in which, no matter the level of 
attendance, a student with developed study skills is more likely to retain.  However, the experts 
provided a probability distribution in which students with developed study skills who 
inconsistently attend class are less likely to retain than students with underdeveloped study skills 
who do consistently attend (see Table 2.7).  The experts described this as a situation unique to 
the institution, noting that inconsistent course attendance of a student with developed study skills 
is an indicator of a larger, more significant problem that will ultimately lessen the likelihood of 
retention.  It is this type of expert-identified situation that speaks to the value of including expert 
opinion in model development.  If data surrounding these variables were available, this type of 
pattern might be viewed as an anomaly without the experts’ insights.  Without data or the 
experts’ opinions, this particular situation may never have been recognized or represented in a 
model.  See Appendix C for more detail concerning probability elicitation techniques and 
protocol. 
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Table 2.7  
 
Parameter estimation.  After elicitation and collection of conditional probabilities on the 
variables for which no or very little quantitative data were available, the researcher employed a 
hybrid approach to parameterization of the final BN’s nodes.  All variables and structure 
recommended by the experts were maintained in the final model as all of the most influential 
variables included in the original “straw man” model were also somehow represented in the 
expert-generated design (e.g., standardized test scores are incorporated into “Academic Rank” 
variable).  Further, the variables recommended by the experts were also found to have theoretical 
underpinnings in the larger retention literature.  Heretofore unused 2012-2014 cohort data were 
used to parameterize seven of the ten nodes for which data were available.  Following the 
guidance of Woodberry, Nicholson, Korb & Pollino (2005) and Pollino, Woodberry, Nicholson, 
Korb, & Hart (2007), data were simulated through Netica to mirror the conditional probabilities 
elicited from the experts for the unknown variables and then manually input into the CPTs using 
Netica.  The final BN incorporating expert-designed structure and a hybrid data-learned/expert-
learned approach to parameterization is shown in Figure 2.7.  Note that this figure only shows 
the current state of each variable – the dynamic and predictive nature of the model is viewed 
through Netica when adding new case information. 
Elicited Probability of “Retention” Given “Study Skills” and “Attendance Patterns:”  Example of 
Unanticipated Probability Patterns 
Study Skills Attendance Patterns p(Retained) p(Not Retained) 
Developed Consistent 86% 14% 
UnderDeveloped Consistent 83% 17% 
Developed Inconsistent 79% 21% 
UnderDeveloped Inconsistent 77% 23% 
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 Figure 2.7.  Final Retention BN. Incorporates hybrid expert- and data-learned construction.   
For example, Figure 2.8 demonstrates the effect on predicted retention for a hypothetical 
student with low levels of social and academic integration.  The student’s degree of social 
integration is reflected by her negative standing on “Social Support” and her academic 
integration is reflected by inconsistent “Attendance Patterns” and no access of “Academic 
Support.”  Viewed within the context of Tinto’s model of retention (the degree to which a 
student is integrated into an institution’s social and academic framework is positively related to 
her likelihood of retention) (Tinto, 1975), this student reflects a high risk of attrition.  This is 
corroborated by the BN, as predicted retention drops from 83.5% to 74.4%.  Table 2.8 
summarizes the model’s retention prediction for a number of scenarios within Tinto’s 
framework.  The final BN suggests that the included population adheres to Tinto’s model in that 
higher degrees of academic and social integration lead to higher likelihood of retention.  
Additionally, reviewing the final BN’s performance in the context of a commonly accepted and 
cited theory of undergraduate retention illustrates the relevance of the model.   
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Figure 2.8.  Final Retention BN, Tinto high attrition risk.  Hypothetical student demonstrates low 
academic integration (inconsistent course attendance and no access to academic support) and low 
social integration (negative social support).  Under Tinto’s model of retention, this student 
represents a high risk of attrition.  Note that probability of retention has decreased from 83.5% to 
74.4%. 
 
 
Table 2.8  
Retention Effects of Variables Related to Tinto’s Model 
 
  
Academic Integration Social Integration p(Not Retained) p(Retained) Attendance 
Patterns 
Academic  
Support 
Social 
Support 
Consistent High Positive 11.0% 89.0% 
Inconsistent High Positive 16.8% 83.2% 
Consistent High Negative 13.3% 86.7% 
Inconsistent High Negative 20.1% 79.9% 
Consistent Low Positive 15.6% 84.4% 
Inconsistent Low Positive 25.3% 74.7% 
Consistent Low Negative 18.8% 81.2% 
Inconsistent Low Negative 29.6% 70.4% 
Consistent None Positive 14.9% 85.1% 
Inconsistent None Positive 21.7% 78.3% 
Consistent None Negative 17.9% 82.1% 
Inconsistent None Negative 25.6% 74.4% 
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 Results 
As with the original “straw man” model, 5-fold cross-validation was employed in order to 
evaluate the predictive accuracy of the final model.  The confusion matrix for the model is 
presented in Table 2.9.  Over the five folds, the final model predicted likelihood of retention 
correctly in 83.5% (592/709) of cases.  The model misclassified cases 16.5% of the time.  This 
measure of overall model performance suggests a more accurate model than the original “straw 
man” network.  However, a closer look at some of the additional measures of performance that 
can be calculated using the confusion matrix (Table 2.10) reveals that the apparent success of the 
model is tempered by other factors.  For example, while the model’s sensitivity, or true positive 
rate, is high at 98% (when a student is actually retained, the model predicts retention 98% of the 
time), the model’s specificity or true negative rate (when a student is not actually retained and 
the model predicts attrition) suffers at merely 5% (6/116).  Similar issues with specificity and 
false positive rates were present in the original “straw man” model, and are most likely due to the 
highly imbalanced class distribution within the dataset.  Within this population, the vast majority 
of students typically retain – it is a “rare” event that students do not retain and such imbalanced 
datasets lead to model overfit and overstated predictive accuracy (Chawla, 2010).  While this 
doesn’t negate the usefulness of a model, it does require the consideration of other evaluative 
measures.   
Table 2.9 
Confusion Matrix and Error Rate – Final BN 
                Predicted  
Retained 
 
Not Retained 
 
Actual 
586 7 Retained 
110 6 Not Retained 
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Table 2.10 
Common Performance Metrics – Final BN and Original “Straw Man” BN 
Metric Calculation Final 
BN 
“straw 
man” BN 
Accuracy (TP + TN)/All Cases 83.5% 79.7% 
Misclassification 1-Accuracy 16.5% 20.3% 
Sensitivity/Recall/True Positive Rate TP/(TP+FN) 98.8% 96.8% 
Specificity/True Negative Rate TN/(FP+TN) 5.2% 3.1% 
Fall-out/False Positive Rate FP/(FP+TN) or 1-Specificity 94.8% 96.9% 
Precision/Positive Prediction Value TP/(TP+FP) 84.2% 81.8% 
F-value (combined measure of 
precision and recall using harmonic 
mean)a 
 1 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝
𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝  90.9% 88.6% 
Note.  TP = True Positive, TN = True Negative, FP = False Positive, FN = False Negative 
aFor F-value, see Buckland & Gey (1994),  β represents the importance of precision relative to 
recall and is typically set to 1.   
 
One such measure is the ROC curve, as it presents transparent information about the 
model’s performance in predicting the minority class and is not dependent on class distributions 
(Kotsiantis, Kanellopoulos, Pintelas, 2006).  Figure 2.9 presents a ROC curve showing the final 
BN’s tradeoff between sensitivity and specificity.  While the AUC (.62446) is slightly higher 
than that found in the “straw man” model, it is still low enough to indicate that the model’s 
sensitivity, or ability to correctly predict retention, is only slightly larger than the model’s 
inability to correctly predict attrition.  In other words, the ROC shows that the model’s true 
positive rates are similar to its false positive rates, suggesting that the model is not necessarily 
discriminating between retention and non-retention and that it’s simply mirroring the high 
prevalence of retention within the underlying data.      
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 Figure 2.9.  Final BN ROC Curve.  This figure illustrates the model’s relationship between 
sensitivity and specificity (solid line) at different thresholds as compared to an uninformative 
model (dashed line). 
 
This is further confirmed with examination of the model’s Cohen’s kappa coefficient (k), 
a calculation that incorporates the possibility of chance effects into the measure of agreement 
between a model’s prediction and actuality (Rosenfield & Fitzpatrick-Lins, 1986).  Cohen’s 
kappa coefficient is described Equation 2.3, where P(a) is the proportion of correctly predicted 
cases and P(e) represents the hypothetical probability of a chance agreement.    
 
𝑘𝑘 = 𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵) − 𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵)1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵)  (2.3) 
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The final model’s kappa coefficient equals .062, indicating that classification agreement is most 
likely due to chance as there is only 6.2% agreement above what is expected by chance alone.  In 
other words, there is little difference between the model’s correct prediction and what might be 
predicted due to chance alone.  Again, this is most likely the result of imbalanced data with a 
high prevalence of retention.   
An analysis of sensitivity of the “Retained” node to the other predictive nodes (Table 
2.11) reveals a substantial amount of uncertainty still unexplained by the final BN.  While the 
two most influential variables (“Academic Rank” and “Financial Need & Risk Profile”) do 
explain away a slightly greater amount of the uncertainty of likelihood of retention (as expressed 
in the Mutual Info column) than found in the “straw man” model, it is notable that the total 
amount of retention uncertainty explained in the final BN (8.56%) is less than that in the original 
“straw man” model (13.04%).  However, as explained earlier, the particularly influential 
variables included in the “straw man” model (SAT scores) are incorporated into the composite 
“Academic Rank” variable in the final BN, suggesting that they are still represented in a 
parsimonious model while also allowing room for other variables deemed important by the 
experts.   
Table 2.11 
Sensitivity Analysis of "Retained" to Other Variables Included in Final BN 
Variable Mutual Info Percent Variance of Beliefs 
Academic Rank .0207 3.21 .0043 
Financial Need & Risk Profile .0180 2.80 .0037 
Study Skills .0059 .91 .0011 
Attendance Patterns .0041 .63 .0008 
Academic Support .0028 .44 .0005 
Distance from Home .0023 .36 .0004 
Social Support .0011 .17 .0002 
Advisor Match/Mismatch .0003 .04 .0000 
Race/Ethnicity .0000   
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Examining Table 2.11 also reveals consensus and conflict with the final influence ratings 
assigned to the variables by the experts.  The model confirms the importance of “Academic 
Rank” and “Study Skills” in predicting retention, but places other variables deemed important by 
the experts (“Social Support,” “Academic Support”) lower in the scale of influence.  Note that 
“Race/Ethnicity” was purposely not included as a direct influence on retention, and this is 
represented accordingly with zero mutual information.  A look at the sensitivity of each 
individual node with other nodes (see Appendix D) is also helpful in evaluating the experts’ 
recommended structure.  For example, “Academic Rank” is highly sensitive to “Financial Need 
& Risk Profile,” suggesting that the assumption of conditional independence among these two 
nodes may need to be further investigated.  In another example, while the experts opined that 
students’ race/ethnicity influenced both “Academic Support” and “Social Support,” sensitivity 
findings of “Race/Ethnicity” to other nodes find that it is merely related to “Academic Support.”   
Recommendations to review a model’s sensitivity to changes in informative priors are 
also included in the literature (Gill, 2009; Reimherr, Meng, & Nicolae, 2014).  Recall that three 
of the nodes included in the final model are comprised of expert-elicited probabilities that serve 
as the informative prior (“Study Skills,” “Attendance Patterns,” and “Academic Support”).  In 
order to evaluate the impact of these prior choices, each of these three nodes were set to uniform 
probability distributions (indicating equally likely states) and the resulting models were 
compared to the final BN in terms of inference.  Unsurprisingly, the expert-elicited priors do 
heavily influence outcomes predicted by the model.  For example, imposing the same Tinto high 
attrition scenario as described in Figure 2.8 on a model in which all of the expert-elicited priors 
are considered uniform results in predicted probability of retention of 82% compared to 74% 
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when using the informative priors.  Conceding the importance of these priors on conclusions that 
can be drawn from the final model further highlights the importance of careful elicitation. 
Table 2.12 summarizes the final model’s complexity measures.  The final model is 
slightly less complex than the original “straw man” model, and should be considered 
parsimonious and not overly complex.  This simplicity is advantageous for explaining and 
demonstrating the model’s use to various audiences. 
Table 2.12 
Final BN Model Complexity Metrics 
Metric Count 
Nodes 10 
Links 15 
Node States 25 
 
A final evaluative measure of the final model surrounds examination of its internal 
validity as measured by whether or not the model performs as expected by the experts.  The 
incorporation of expert information in the development of the final BN’s structure as well as 
select parameters requires that some evaluation of the model’s capacity to adequately reflect the 
experts’ expectations take place.  During the second elicitation session experts were asked to 
hypothesize the probability of retention given a number of scenarios.  The scenarios chosen for 
testing were done so based on discussions during both elicitation sessions and focused on expert 
indications of important and influential variables or situations unique to retention at the 
institution.  Comparison of the experts’ predicted retention rates with those resulting from 
imposition of the case scenarios on the final model reveals varied results and is summarized in 
Table 2.13.  Large differences between the experts’ and final BN predictions appear to be a result 
to two main factors:  Systematic under-prediction by the experts and disagreement between the 
variables deemed most influential by the experts and the model.  For example, the experts 
considered “Financial Need & Risk Profile” to be only mildly influential on retention, while the 
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model found it to be a top predictor.  The difference between expert and model prediction in 
scenario four is due to this disagreement – the model recognizes the large impact of a high 
“Financial Need & Risk Profile” on retention, while the experts discounted this influence.  
Similarly, differences in the predictions for scenario six reflects the experts’ expectation that 
negative “Social Support” heavily influences retention and the model’s estimation that any 
impact of negative “Social Support” is greatly outweighed by high “Academic Rank” and 
developed “Study Skills.”    
Table 2.13 
Comparison of Final BN Predictions and Expert-Elicited Predictions of Retention Given 
Different Scenarios 
Scenario:  What is the probability of retention, given: Expert 
Prediction 
Final BN 
Prediction 
1. Within an hour, strong academic background, developed study 
skills 
85% 89% 
2. More than an hour, strong academic background, developed 
study skills 
88% 92% 
3. Underdeveloped study skills, moderate academic background, 
consistent class attendance and positive social support 
84% 85.5% 
4. Underdeveloped study skills, low academic rank, high 
financial need/risk profile 
79% 74.5% 
5. Developed study skills, high academic rank, high financial 
need/risk profile 
85% 57%a 
6. Developed study skills, high academic rank, within an hour, 
low social support 
80% 90% 
7. Underdeveloped study skills, low academic rank, within an 
hour, low social support 
79% 80% 
aUnreliable result due to very few examples of this scenario found in underlying or simulated 
data  
 
In summary, cursory measures of predictive accuracy reveal a fairly strong final model.  
However, closer examination of other evaluative measures indicate challenges due to imbalanced 
training data with a strong prevalence of retention over attrition.  The model is particularly weak 
in classifying the “rare” cases of attrition, with a high rate of false positive classifications of 
retention.  In terms of sensitivity, very few of the included variables explain an adequate amount 
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of uncertainty in the model, but those that are most influential were also weighted heavily by the 
experts.  Issues of the model’s internal validity in terms of agreement with experts’ predictions 
center on these same disagreements in expert and model weightings, although some predictions 
were very close.   
Conclusion 
This study was designed to explore two main ideas:  Using the literature, data, and expert 
information to identify important causal influences on retention, and employing a hybrid data- 
and expert-learned approach to constructing a Bayesian network that adequately predicts 
retention.  While the predictive power of the final BN created using a combination of expert 
information and data suffers from imbalanced training data, the employment of experts in the 
identification, discussion, and quantification of influential retention variables can be considered 
successful.  Regardless of the research outcomes, both stages of the research revealed that the 
process of incorporating expert information into designing models adds a level of insight and 
institutional knowledge that might otherwise be unrecognized.   
Identification of Retention Variables 
The development of a Bayesian network incorporating both expert knowledge and prior 
data allows for an individualized model that is specific to the institution, reflecting its student 
population, culture, and other characteristics.  As Robbins et al. (2004) explained, relying solely 
on research literature to guide the choice of variables is limiting as “the research literature ranges 
across many psychological and educational content domains, which dampens efforts at 
integrating or evaluating the empirical literature…”  (p. 262).  Combining data and expert 
knowledge introduces insights that might otherwise be unrecognized or unacknowledged within 
the presence of only one of these sources of information.  The experts identified patterns that 
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were unique to the institutions (e.g. greater distance from home correlates with higher retention, 
students with highly developed study skills and inconsistent course attendance trigger more 
significant retention red flags than students with less developed study skills), and were able to 
parse among the numerous retention prediction variables found in the literature to suggest a 
simple and parsimonious model structure.  While data-mining procedures may have ultimately 
identified these unexpected patterns, preemptory knowledge of such institution-specific events 
allows for more directed and efficient modeling and evaluation.   
In future iterations or replications of this research, it is recommended that the elicitation 
facilitator be very familiar with the research topic and its coverage within the wider scholarly 
literature.  Extensive background knowledge on the part of the facilitator helps maintain focus 
during discussions with experts, and allows everyone involved in the discussion to speak the 
same topical language.  It is equally important to spend ample time on collaboratively 
developing and finalizing explicit operating definitions for the identified variables.  Recognition 
of the importance of this might have resulted in fewer changes in the variables’ definitions 
between elicitation sessions one and two and redirected valuable discussion time in elicitation 
session two from finalizing operating definitions to actual performance of the model (see the 
change in “Academic Support” as an example).  Finally, it is highly recommended that, given 
experts’ and researchers’ limited time and resources, all elicitation sessions be accompanied by 
pre-elicitation materials outlining the sessions’ expectations, goals, and even a timed agenda.  
Keeping the session on track and focused is critical in producing usable and relevant information 
within an often limited timeline.    
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Construction and Performance of BNs   
The process of model construction revealed a number of insights.  In terms of expert 
participation, discussions during both elicitation sessions confirmed a high amount of consensus 
and agreement among the two experts.  For example, comparison of the individually drafted 
structures that were ultimately transformed into the expert-elicited structural model exposed 
striking agreement between the experts’ understandings of the causal influences and 
relationships between retention variables.  Similar consensus was found during the probability 
elicitations, particularly in terms of expressions of uncertainty and concerns over bias.  While 
expert solidarity does not necessarily assure expert accuracy or precision, it does provide 
reassurance of consistent opinion.   
As addressed earlier, the final BN’s performance suffers in terms of identifying and 
predicting non-retention.  This is particularly troubling considering that it is this specific group 
of students, those at risk of not returning, in whom model stakeholders are most interested.  This 
finding highlights the importance of in-depth model evaluation outside of simple predictive 
accuracy.  Perhaps due to the capability of BNs to handle scarce data and uncertainty, thus 
making evaluation and validation more difficult, many studies involving BNs simply do not 
include quantitative model evaluation (Aguilera, Fernández, Fernández, Rumi, & Salmerón, 
2011).  Without evaluation of the additional metrics described in Table 2.9, the false positive 
classification issues resulting from imbalanced dataset would have gone unnoticed and an 
inadequate model would be adopted by stakeholders for use in decision-making and intervention.   
Finally, model construction confirmed the importance of carefully considering variable 
operating definitions and the assignment of underlying data to less-than-certainly defined 
variables.  For example, analysis of node sensitivity (Table 2.10) revealed conflict between data-
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learned and expert-anticipated importance of certain variables like “Social Support.”  This 
finding does not unilaterally negate the experts’ opinions that positive or negative social support 
plays an important role in influencing retention.  Rather, it could simply mean that the data used 
to parameterize this variable (whether or not a student lived on a dorm floor that had unusually 
high attrition) was not particularly descriptive of or relevant to what experts’ perceive as social 
support.  Again, this finding emphasizes the importance of comprehensive model evaluation, 
including analysis of sensitivity and unexpected results.   
Use of a formalized elicitation framework like SHELF proved invaluable to 
accomplishing the goals of the probability elicitation session within a limited timeframe.  
Additionally, use of a spreadsheet pre-populated with formulas that could be used to quickly 
demonstrate the conditional probabilistic impact of elicited distributions on the variables pleased 
the experts and allowed them additional opportunities for feedback and revision.  As a major 
goal of any elicitation of expert information is to assure that the opinions of experts are 
communicated and received clearly and accurately, it is recommended that preparation of such 
materials and tools be repeated in any future iterations or replications of this research.   
Importance of Process 
While the final BN includes major limitations concerning its current usefulness for 
predicting retention or acting as an early intervention tool, it is important to recognize that the 
process of model development can be considered as important as the final model itself.  Those 
involved in shaping the decisions and policies related to a predicted behavior are required to 
formally discuss and articulate influential factors.  These formal discussions result in a deeper 
understanding of the problem at hand, allowing decision-makers to set future priorities for 
resource allocation, data collection, and additional study.  In other words, the process of 
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reviewing the literature and shaping a model, especially in the first elicitation session, revealed a 
large number of variables that the experts think the institution should be tracking.  For example, 
the experts were confident that whether or not a student accessed academic support programming 
affects likelihood of retention.  However, the formal structural and probability elicitations 
required them to trouble this anecdotal and somewhat vague conclusion and operationally define 
and quantify student access to academic support programming and its implications.  Further, the 
elicitation revealed a lack of quantitative data surrounding an activity that the experts feel is an 
important factor in predicting retention.  Given their expressed uncertainty about the prevalence 
and definition of the “Academic Support” variable, it became clear that collection of quantitative 
data related to student access to academic support programming and retention should be initiated 
in order to support or negate the expert intuition.  Even variables for which data were available 
included concerns of whether or not they were the “correct” data for describing a condition (see 
earlier discussion of “Social Support”).  Any and all formal consideration and discussion of these 
types serves to only increase the knowledge-base and awareness of retention issues, thus setting 
the stage for even better model construction and utilization.   
Limitations and Future Study 
A major advantage of the use of BNs is their capacity to adapt to new information.  As 
cohorts mature and new data are gathered, these data can be added as new cases from which the 
model will learn.  Parameters can easily be updated given new insights from data or additional 
experts, and the model will reflect different predictions given a changing student body and other 
new information.  Given emphasis on non-cognitive influences found in the most recent retention 
literature, particular attention will be paid to inclusion of these types of variables.  Future 
versions of the model will be re-presented to experts for review and evaluation, as well as 
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elicitation of any structural and probabilistic shifts that may arise.  Maintaining an open feedback 
loop with the experts through model creation, evaluation and refinement is critical, and will be 
employed going forward.  As recommended by Pollino, Woodberry, Nicholson, Korb, & Hart 
(2007), an unaffiliated third party reviewer may be brought in to review and evaluate any future 
expert-elicited CPTs.   
However, as attrition is already a “rare” event, and may grow even rarer as additional 
focus and resources are allocated towards increasing retention, the problems created by such 
imbalanced data will not be alleviated.  In order to create a more adequate predictive BN, it is 
necessary to explore alternatives to traditional training/testing data sets for parameterizing the 
variables for which data are available.  Future proposed study involves the investigation of 
sampling strategies that are designed to mitigate the influences of imbalanced data.  A number of 
authors review and recommend strategies for handling imbalanced data sets within the context of 
classification, ranging from simple over/under-sampling to more complex algorithmic 
approaches (Chawla, 2010; Kotsiantis, Kannellopoulos, Pintelas, 2006; Weiss & Provost, 2003), 
as well as quantification of the costs of misclassification (Japkowicz & Stephen, 2002; Monard 
& Batista, 2002).  Comparison of these approaches based on model performance metrics like 
those summarized in Table 2.9 are planned for future study.  
Additionally, future study will include more model comparison in general.  As more data 
become available, a comparison of the performance, complexity, and sensitivity of strictly data-
learned, strictly expert-informed, and even hybrid constructed models would offer additional 
insights into the understanding and reliability of experts, the quality of retention-related data, and 
the interaction between both these sources.  Metrics of model comparison include Bayesian 
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Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978) and Minimum Description Length (MDL) 
(Rissanen, 1996).   
A further option for future study involves contrasting BN performance and advantages 
against those of logistic regression and other forms of discriminant analysis.  While logistic 
regression is often used as a technique for prediction and classification, the inclusion of experts 
without extensive experience in statistical methodology, the transparent depiction of uncertainty, 
and the user-friendly graphical and dynamic representation of variable relationships in a BN 
called for the exploration of its usefulness in this research.  Depending on the type and nature of 
the predicted variable, the performance of BNs versus logistic regression is mixed (Ducher et al., 
2013; Schmeits & Kok, 2010).  However, simply the act of comparing performance and other 
aspects of predictive BNs to logistic regression models offers an opportunity for insights related 
to overfitting, missing data, and variable importance that can be helpful in selecting and 
defending model choice (Roos, Wettig, Grünwald, Myllmäki, & Tirri, 2005; Tu, 1996). 
While the limitations introduced by imbalanced and unavailable training/testing data are 
important and encourage further study, it is important to consider that a major contribution of 
this study lies within the lessons learned through the process of combining expert and 
quantitative data.  Initiating and maintaining formal elicitation practices that reinforce focus and 
discipline during sessions, allowing experts to quickly view their judgements’ implications, and 
prioritizing the development of clear and detailed operating definitions are recommendations 
generalizable to other studies formally incorporating expert judgements of any subject-matter.  
Additionally, this research stresses importance of complete model evaluation in any context as a 
critical step, the exclusion of which could lead to seriously flawed conclusions.  Most 
importantly, the flexibility and usefulness of a Bayesian networks in the incorporation of unique 
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and valuable expert judgement, often minimized or ignored, is highlighted.  While data-mining 
has its advantages and place within predictive modeling, BNs allow for the combination of both 
sources while still transparently accounting for uncertainty in a format that is easily understood 
and employed by multiple audiences.    
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A 
Table A1 
Variables Commonly Cited as Influences on Retention and Examples in the Literature 
Broad Category Predictors Literature Examples 
Student 
Characteristics 
 (Pre-College) 
Race-Ethnicity Scott , Bailey, & Kienzl, 2006 
Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010 
Pike, Hansen, & Childress, 2014 
Gender Pike, 2013 
Scott , Bailey, & Kienzl, 2006 
Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010 
Socioeconomic 
Status/Pell Eligibility 
Hosch, 2008 
Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010 
Pike, Hansen, & Childress, 2014 
First Generation  Thayer, 2000 
Longwell-Grice & Longwell-Grice, 
2008 
Soria & Stebleton, 2012 
Pre-College  
Academic 
Records 
High School GPA Waugh, Micceri, & Takalkar, 1994 
Adelman, 1999 
Fredricks, Blumenfield, & Paris, 2004 
ACT, 2010 
Standardized Achievement 
Test Scores 
Kahn & Nauta, 2001 
Reason, 2003 
Lotkowski, Robbins, & Noeth, 2004 
Astin & Oseguera, 2005 
Class Rank Adelman, 1999 
Student 
Characteristics 
(College) 
Financial Support/Ability to 
Pay 
Titus, 2006 
Astin & Oseguera 
Socioeconomic Status/Pell 
Eligibility 
Hosch, 2008 
Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010 
Remediation/Remedial 
Courses 
Roska, Davis, Jaggars, Zeidenberg, &  
Cho, 2009 
Scott-Clayton & Rodriguez, 2015 
Academic Engagement  Beck & Davidson, 2001 
Bowen, Chingos, & McPherson, 2009 
Self-Efficacy/Personality Boulter, 2002 
Chemers, Hu, & Garcia, 2001 
Tross, Harper, Osher, & Kneidinger, 
2000 
Study Skills Robbins, Lauver, Le, Davis, Langley, & 
Carlstrom, 2004 
Attendance Patterns Harrington & Fogg, 2009 
176 
 
First-Year Academic 
Performance 
Makuakane-Drechsel & Hagedorn, 2000 
Kiser & Price, 2008 
Commuter/Boarder Ryan, 2004 
Scott , Bailey, & Kienzl, 2006 
Hosch, 2008 
Distance from Home Bista & Foster, 2011 
Full-Time/Part-Time Bean & Metzner, 1985 
Reason, 2003 
Social Support DeBerard, Spielmans, & Julka, 2004 
Wilcox, Winn, & Fyvie-Gauld, 2005 
Eckles & Stradley, 2011 
Social 
Involvement/Engagement 
Hurtado & Carter, 1997 
Winston & Zimmerman, 2004 
Hausmann, Schofield, & Woods, 2007 
Institutional 
Characteristics 
Institutional Control Ryan, 2004 
Astin & Oseguera, 2012 
Pike, 2013 
Institutional Selectivity Gansmer-Topf & Schuh, 2006 
Astin & Oseguera, 2012 
Academic Support Ryan, 2004 
Oseguera & Rhee, 2009 
Pike, 2013 
First-Year Programs Porter & Swing, 2006 
Howard, 2013 
Institutional Mission Titus, 2004 
Astin & Oseguera, 2012 
Seidman, 2012 
Pike & Graunke, 2015 
Institution Size Ryan, 2004 
Pike, 2013 
Organizational Behavior Berger, 2001-2002 
Kuh, 2001-2002 
Focus on Retention Bonous-Hammarth, 2000 
Longden, 2006 
Oseguera & Rhee, 2009 
Campus Climate Berger & Milem, 2000 
Titus, 2004 
Oseguera & Rhee, 2009 
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Appendix B 
Structure Elicitation Session Worksheet 
Variable General 
Variable  
Category 
Proposed Operating 
Definition 
Variable Classes Causal 
Influence 
(Retention) 
Causal 
Influence 
(Other 
Variables) 
Conditional 
Independence 
Variable Weight 
Which variables can be 
considered direct causes of 
retention/attrition?  Which 
variables are considered 
indirect causes of 
retention/attrition as they 
actually influence other 
included variables? 
Does a 
student’s state 
on variable X 
give you a lot 
of information 
about how they 
might be 
represented on 
(non-output) 
variable Y? 
Please rank the 
included 
variables in 
terms of 
ultimate 
influence on 
retention – 
identify the 
strongest and 
weakest and 
move inward 
from there. 
Gender Student 
Characteristics  
(Pre-College) 
Self-identified gender Male/Female    
Socioeconomic 
Status/Pell 
Eligibility 
Student 
Characteristics  
(Pre-College) 
Pell eligibility acts as 
a proxy for 
socioeconomic status.  
Students eligible for 
Federal Pell Grants 
are considered low 
income/high financial 
need.     
Pell eligible/Not 
Pell eligible 
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Race-Ethnicity Student 
Characteristics  
(Pre-College) 
Federally-defined 
race/ethnicity 
categories, as 
reported by student 
off Common 
Application.   
IPEDS 
Race/Ethnicity 
Categories 
   
First 
Generation 
Student 
Characteristics  
(Pre-College) 
Self-reported and 
defined in Common 
Application as an 
individual both of 
whose parents did not 
complete a 
baccalaureate degree, 
or, in the case of an 
individual who 
regularly resided with 
and received support 
from only one parent, 
an individual whose 
only such parent did 
not complete a 
baccalaureate degree. 
First Generation/ 
Not First 
Generation 
   
High School 
GPA 
Academic 
Preparation  
(Pre-College) 
High school GPA 
used to determine 
admission eligibility - 
this is calculated 
from a student's high 
school transcript, but 
only using certain 
courses of interest to 
admitting institution.  
0.0-.99 
1.0-1.99 
2.0-2.99 
3.0-4.0 
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Standardized 
Achievement 
Test Scores 
Academic 
Preparation  
(Pre-College) 
ACT or SAT scores 
typically used for 
admissions decisions.  
SAT Scores consist 
of Critical Reading, 
Math, and Writing 
Components.  ACT 
Composite score 
calculated from 
scores on English, 
Math, Reading, and 
Science tests. 
TBD     
Class Rank Academic 
Preparation  
(Pre-College) 
Rank among high 
school class - 
typically presented as 
percentile. 
TBD     
Financial 
Support/Ability 
to Pay 
Student 
Characteristics  
(College) 
Percent of FAFSA-
determined need met 
by institution 
0-50% 
51-75% 
76-100% 
   
Socioeconomic 
Status/Pell 
Eligibility 
Student 
Characteristics  
(College) 
Pell eligibility acts as 
a proxy for 
socioeconomic status.  
Students eligible for 
Federal Pell Grants 
are considered low 
income/high financial 
need.     
Pell eligible/Not 
Pell eligible 
   
Remediation/ 
Remedial 
Courses 
Student 
Characteristics  
(College) 
Elementary courses 
required as a 
prerequisite to 
college-level 
coursework. 
Participation/No
n-Participation 
   
180 
 
Academic 
Engagement 
Student 
Characteristics  
(College) 
Frequency of:  
student interaction 
with faculty, 
insightful, co-
curricular 
contribution to class 
discussions, synthesis 
of coursework. 
TBD     
Study Skills Student 
Characteristics  
(College) 
Activities necessary 
to organize and 
complete school work 
tasks, and prepare for 
and take tests, 
including time 
management, test 
taking skills, using 
information 
resources, taking 
notes in class and 
interacting with 
faculty. 
TBD     
Attendance 
Patterns 
Student 
Characteristics  
(College) 
Whether or not a 
student consistently 
attends scheduled 
classes. 
Yes = 75% of 
classes? 
   
First-Year 
Academic 
Performance 
Student 
Characteristics  
(College) 
Cumulative GPA at 
the end of first 
academic year.  Or 
first academic 
semester? 
0.0-.99 
1.0-1.99 
2.0-2.99 
3.0-4.0 
   
Commuter/ 
Boarder 
Student 
Characteristics  
(College) 
Whether or not a 
student resides in 
campus housing 
during first year.  
Yes/No    
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Distance from 
Home 
Student 
Characteristics  
(College) 
Distance from 
students main 
family/caregivers.   
0-1 hours 
More than 1 
hour, less than 2 
More than 2 
hours, less than 
4 
More than 4 
hours 
   
Full-Time/Part-
Time 
Student 
Characteristics  
(College) 
Full time enrollment 
indicated by twelve 
or more hours during 
both first-year 
semesters.   
Full-time/Part-
time 
   
Social Support Student 
Characteristics  
(College) 
Integration with, and 
emotional support 
received by, friends 
in the first year of 
college. 
TBD     
Social 
Involvement/ 
Engagement 
Student 
Characteristics  
(College) 
Integration into and 
participation in social 
activities (college-
wide and residential) 
that fosters a sense of 
belonging.   
TBD     
Institutional 
Control 
Institutional 
Characteristics 
Whether or not an 
institution is privately 
controlled or part of a 
public system. 
Private/Public    
Institutional 
Selectivity 
Institutional 
Characteristics 
The level at which 
applying students are 
typically  admitted.  
More selective 
institutions have 
lower admission rates 
and higher pre-
50-65% 
66-75% 
76-100% 
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college academic 
admissions 
requirements. 
Academic 
Support 
Institutional 
Characteristics 
The extent to which 
an institution 
provides and 
promotes academic 
support to first-year 
students.   
TBD    
First-Year 
Programs 
Institutional 
Characteristics 
Whether or not an 
institution provides 
programming aimed 
at first-year students, 
and the extent to 
which these are 
supported, promoted 
and sustained. 
Yes/No    
Institutional 
Mission 
Institutional 
Characteristics 
The educational 
mission of the 
institution, as 
measured by 
persistence goals.  
The persistence goals 
of a community 
college are very 
different than those 
of a four-year 
institution.   
Focus on 
Persistence/No 
Focus on 
Persistence 
   
Focus on 
Retention 
Institutional 
Characteristics 
The extent to which 
an institution has 
prioritized retention, 
as measured by 
staffing and 
programming geared 
Prioritized 
Retention/Not 
Prioritized 
Retention 
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towards increasing 
retention and 
graduation rates.   
Campus 
Climate 
Institutional 
Characteristics 
Culture in which 
students feel valued 
and empowered by 
campus peers, 
faculty, and 
administration 
Positive Campus 
Climate/ 
Negative 
Campus Climate 
   
184 
 
 Appendix C 
Examples of Elicitation Session II Materials & Technique 
Appendix C.1 - Pre-Elicitation Materials (Provided One Week Prior to Elicitation Session II) 
Elicitation Date/Time:  Thursday, December 17, 2015, 9:00 – 11:00 am (Jenn’s Office) 
Participants:  Jennifer Cannady, Machamma Quinichett, Corey Dunn (facilitator) 
Objectives: 
1.  Review and critique interim model incorporating proposed structure and variables 
from first elicitation session 
2.  Obtain probability distributions that represent experts’ experience and uncertainty 
about specific variables related to retention (see highlighted variables in attached list 
of variables included in model) 
3.  Review resulting model specifications 
 
Elicitation of Probabilities Notes: 
• You will not be asked to provide single estimates of probabilities 
• You will be asked to discuss plausible ranges of probabilities for each uncertain 
variable, and whether or not some values are more likely than others 
• Uncertainty is part of the process – feel free to express your uncertainty 
 
Common Causes of Bias to Avoid: 
• Availability – easier-to-recall occurrence may incorrectly be deemed more 
important or likely.   
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 o Example:  Notable exceptions, students to whom experts were more 
familiar, etc. 
• Representativeness - similarity doesn’t necessarily mean events are 
probabilistically related.  The conjunction of two events can’t be more probable 
than either event separately. 
o Example: expert suggesting that the likelihood that a student has unmet 
need and is retained is greater than the likelihood that a student has unmet 
need. 
o Particularly relevant to the elicitation of conditional probabilities 
• Adjustment & Anchoring – experts may calculate probability based on an initial 
value 
• Overconfidence 
• Hindsight Bias – experts who have seen sample data may let it influence their 
opinion 
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 Appendix C.2 - Probability Review Provided to Experts (Provided One Week Prior to Elicitation 
Session II) 
 
Probability – measure of the likelihood of a random phenomenon or chance behavior.  
Describes the long-term proportion with which a certain outcome will occur in situations with 
short-term uncertainty. 
• Probabilities are numbers between zero and one – the closer it is to one, the more likely 
the event is to occur. 
• Computing Probability Using the Classical Method: 
 If an experiment has n equally likely outcomes and if the number of ways that an event E 
can occur is m, then the probability of E, P(E), is  
𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸) =  number of ways that 𝐸𝐸 can occurnumber of possible outcomes =  𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝  
 
Subjective probability of an outcome is probability obtained on the basis of personal judgment.  
Experts will be asked to provide estimates of subjective probability. 
• Independence – two events E and F are independent if the occurrence of event E in a 
probability experiment does not affect the probability of event F.  
• Example – obtaining heads on first coin toss has no effect on the likelihood of 
obtaining heads on second toss. 
• Dependence – two events are dependent if the occurrence of event E in a probability 
experiment affects the probability of event F.   
• Example – the likelihood of higher career earnings is related to education level. 
 
Conditional Probability – the probability that event F occurs, given that the event E has 
occurred 
P(F|E) – the probability of event F given event E 
• Very important concept in our retention model 
 
Important Rules of Probability 
• The probability of any event must be between 0 and 1, inclusive. If we let E denote any 
event, then 0  ≤ P(E) ≤ 1. 
• The sum of the probabilities of all outcomes must equal 1. 
• If E and F are independent events, then P (E and F) = P(E) * P(F)  (Multiplication 
Rule) 
• If E and F are any two events, then 
𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹|𝐸𝐸) =  𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸 and 𝐹𝐹)
𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸)  
• The probability of event F occurring, given the occurrence of event E, is found by 
dividing the probability of E and F by the probability of E.   (Conditional Probability 
Rule) 
• Two events E and F are independent if P(E|F) = P(E) or, equivalently, if P(F|E) = P(F).  
(Conditional Independence) 
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 Appendix C.3 - Probability Elicitation Protocol – “Attendance Patterns” Example 
 
In our earlier session, you indicated that Attendance Patterns are related to Retention, but 
are also affected by a student's Study Skills.  As of yet, we don't have any data or data proxy to 
quantify students' attendance patterns.  
 
First, let's talk about what you think about students’ attendance patterns, given no other 
information.  We’ve defined attendance of more than 80% of courses as "Consistent."  Let’s talk 
about how attendance is related to retention - given a student consistently attends courses, what 
is the likelihood that they'll retain (given no other knowledge at this point)?  What is your level 
of confidence in this? 
 
We also talked about how attendance patterns are influenced by study skills - now I'm 
going to ask you to think about attendance patterns as the effect and Study Skills as the cause.  
Given a student has Developed Study Skills, what is the probability that they will consistently 
attend class?  What is your confidence in this estimate?  Do you think that this influence is strong 
or weak? 
 
Now, we need to pull this whole line of influence together - let's talk about the 
probability of retention given SS and AP… 
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 Questions:  
Given a student has Developed SS and Consistent AP, what is an estimate of a high/low/medium 
probability they'll retain? 
 
Given a student has UnderDeveloped SS and Consistent AP, what is an estimate of a 
high/low/medium probability they’ll retain? 
 
Given a student has Developed SS and Inconsistent AP, what is an estimate of a 
high/low/medium probability they’ll retain? 
  
Given a student has UnderDeveloped SS and Inconsistent AP, what is an estimate of a 
high/low/medium probability they'll retain? 
 
Remember your conclusions about the strong/weak influences on Retention - if you think 
that developed study skills are more influential on retention than consistent attendance patterns 
(as you indicated in initial session), make sure that the probabilities reflect this.   
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 Appendix D 
Table D1 
Final BN Node Sensitivities 
 Node Mutual Info Percent Variance of 
Beliefs 
Sensitivity of 
“Retained” to a 
finding at 
another node: 
Academic Rank 
 
.02072 3.21 .0042552 
Financial Need 
& Risk Profile 
.01804 2.8 .0037342 
Study Skills 
 
.00585 .907 .0011329 
Attendance 
Patterns 
.00405 .628 .0008366 
Academic 
Support 
.00284 .44 .0005185 
Distance from 
Home 
.00234 .363 .0004477 
Social Support 
 
.00112 .174 .0002162 
Advisor/Major 
Mismatch 
.00028 .043 .0000524 
Race/Ethnicity 
 
.00000 0 .0000000 
Sensitivity of 
“Study Skills” to 
a finding at 
another node: 
Attendance 
Patterns 
.01431 1.47 .0048639 
Academic 
Support 
.01427 1.47 .0047703 
Retained 
 
.00585 .602 .0019775 
Academic Rank 
 
.00018 .0189 .0000612 
Financial Need 
& Risk Profile 
.00016 .0166 .0000537 
Distance from 
Home 
.00002 .00199 .0000064 
Social Support 
 
.00001 .000959 .0000031 
Advisor/Major 
Mismatch 
 
.00000 .000234 .0000008 
Race/Ethnicity 
 
.00000 0 .0000000 
Sensitivity of 
“Race/Ethnicity” 
Academic 
Support 
.01741 1.3 .0045111 
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 to a finding at 
another node: 
Social Support 
 
.00000 0 .0000000 
Attendance 
Patterns 
.00000 0 .0000000 
Distance from 
Home 
.00000 0 .0000000 
Advisor/Major 
Mismatch 
.00000 0 .0000000 
Academic Rank 
 
.00000 0 .0000000 
Study Skills 
 
.00000 0 .0000000 
Financial Need 
& Risk Profile 
.00000 0 .0000000 
Retained 
 
.00000 0 .0000000 
Sensitivity of 
“Distance from 
Home” to a 
finding at 
another node: 
Retained 
 
.00234 .235 .0008069 
Academic Rank 
 
.00007 .00731 .0000250 
Social Support 
 
.00007 .00679 .0000232 
Financial Need 
& Risk Profile 
.00006 .00642 .0000219 
Study Skills 
 
.00002 .00195 .0000066 
Attendance 
Patterns 
.00001 .00144 .0000049 
Academic 
Support 
.00001 .000892 .0000030 
Advisor/Major 
Mismatch 
.00000 .00000 .0000003 
Race/Ethnicity 
 
.00000 0 .000000 
Sensitivity of 
“Attendance 
Patterns” to a 
finding at 
another node: 
Study Skills 
 
.01431 2.4 .0025088 
Retained 
 
.00405 .679 .0007532 
Academic 
Support 
 
.00025 .0415 .0000429 
Academic Rank 
 
.00013 .0226 .0000233 
Financial Need 
& Risk Profile 
.00012 .0198 .0000205 
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 Distance from 
Home 
.00001 .0024 .0000025 
Social Support 
 
.00001 .00115 .0000012 
Advisor/Major 
Mismatch 
.00000 .000288 .0000003 
Race/Ethnicity 
 
.00000 0 .000000 
Sensitivity of 
“Academic 
Support” to a 
finding at 
another node: 
Race/Ethnicity 
 
.01741 1.13 .0031333 
Study Skills 
 
.01427 .93 .0025795 
Retained 
 
.00284 .185 .0003825 
Attendance 
Patterns 
.00025 .0161 .0000402 
Academic Rank 
 
.00008 .0055 .0000122 
Financial Need 
& Risk Profile 
.00007 .00483 .00000107 
Distance from 
Home 
.00001 .000578 .0000013 
Social Support 
 
.00000 .000274 .0000006 
Advisor/Major 
Mismatch 
.00000 .000000 .0000002 
Sensitivity of 
“Social Support” 
to a finding at 
another node: 
Retained 
 
.00112 .118 .0003647 
Distance from 
Home 
.00007 .00713 .0000217 
Academic Rank 
 
.00004 .0037 .0000113 
Financial Need 
& Risk Profile 
.00003 .00325 .0000099 
Study Skills 
 
.00001 .000996 .0000030 
Attendance 
Patterns 
.00001 .000728 .0000022 
Academic 
Support 
.0000 .000448 .0000014 
Advisor/Major 
Mismatch 
.0000 .000000 .0000001 
Race/Ethnicity 
 
.0000 0 .0000000 
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 Sensitivity of 
“Academic 
Rank” to a 
finding at 
another node: 
Financial Need 
& Risk Profile 
.32327 14.1 .0214356 
Retained 
 
.02072 .904 .0021506 
Study Skills 
 
.00018 .00801 .0000130 
Attendance 
Patterns 
.00013 .00587 .0000098 
Academic 
Support 
.00008 .00369 .0000058 
Distance from 
Home 
.00007 .00317 .0000051 
Social Support 
 
.00004 .00153 .0000025 
Advisor/Major 
Mismatch 
.00001 .000373 .0000006 
Race/Ethnicity 
 
.0000 0 .0000000 
Sensitivity of 
“Financial Need 
& Risk Profile” 
to a finding at 
another node: 
Academic Rank 
 
.32327 39.6 .0734777 
Retained 
 
.01804 2.21 .0051425 
Study Skills 
 
.00016 .0197 .0000424 
 
Attendance 
Patterns 
.00012 .0145 .0000313 
Academic 
Support 
.00007 .00908 .0000194 
Distance from 
Home 
.00006 .0078 .0000167 
Social Support 
 
.00003 .00376 .0000081 
Advisor/Major 
Mismatch 
.00001 .000917 .0000020 
Race/Ethnicity 
 
.0000 0 .0000000 
Sensitivity of 
“Advisor/Major 
Mismatch” to a 
finding at 
another node: 
Retained 
 
.00028 .0302 .0000849 
Academic Rank 
 
.00001 .000926 .0000026 
Financial Need 
& Risk Profile 
.00001 .000815 .0000023 
 
Study Skills 
 
.00000 .000251 .0000007 
Attendance 
Patterns 
.00000 .000185 .0000005 
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 Academic 
Support 
.00000 .000116 .0000003 
Distance from 
Home 
.00000 .000000 .0000003 
Social Support 
 
.00000 .000000 .0000001 
Race/Ethnicity 
 
.00000 0 .0000000 
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